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This dissertation explores the determinants of when voters are willing to support 
corrupt politicians. The first paper presents a unique survey experiment that asks 
respondents to choose between pairs of politicians who have different ideological 
positions, and are accused of corruption. The survey goes some way toward 
recreating the tradeoffs one makes when voting in the real world. Results show that 
voters are more likely to choose corrupt politicians who agree with their position on 
an issue when issue salience is high. Results also show that institutional trust 
decreases the likelihood of choosing a corrupt politician, while perceptions of 
corruption increase the likelihood. Institutional trust and perceptions of corruption 
also have a modifying effect on issue salience.  
The second paper uses several datasets to test the effects of several mechanisms on 
the likelihood of a person voting for Silvio Berlusconi. Taking Berlusconi as the 
archetypal corrupt yet electorally successful politician I show that social norms that 
  
justify corruption in one’s peer group extend to voting and increase the likelihood of 
supporting Berlusconi. I find that perceptions of political corruption have an effect on 
the likelihood of supporting Berlusconi, and that this effect is not constant over time. 
I also find that trust in the judiciary has no effect on the likelihood of supporting 
Berlusconi – contrary to Berlusconi’s claims of persecution by the judiciary – and 
that trusting the institution of television has a strong effect on the likelihood of voting 
for Berlusconi. 
The third paper uses a unique survey experiment to measure changes in the support of 
voters for corrupt politicians. Results show that context matters, with voters’ 
sensitivity to corruption being shaped by the type of political post held by politicians 
and the overall corruption in the political system. Experimental results show that 
voters are more forgiving of acts of corruption among higher ranked politicians in 
executive politicians, when corruption is common.  
Overall, I provide evidence showing that voters are often willing to support corrupt 
politicians, and that transparency alone will have a limited effect in increasing the 
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In ways large and small, corruption hurts us all. It impedes social and economic 
development. It erodes the public’s trust, hurts investment and undermines 
democracy and the rule of law. It facilitates terrorism, conflict and organized 
crime. 
Kofi Annan, First Conference of the States 
Parties to the UN Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC)1 
 
This dissertation is motivated by one main question: Why do people vote for corrupt 
politicians? The assumption of this question is that people do support corrupt politicians, 
and indeed, several studies have shown that the electoral consequences of corruption are 
often mild. In the United States, most members of the House of Representatives charged 
with corruption between 1968 and 1990 were reelected (Peters and Welch 1980, Welch 
and Hibbing 1997). A study of the Italian parliament from 1948 to 1994 found minor 
consequences for corruption (Chang et al 2010). In his study of Japan, Reed (1999) finds 
that legislators who are indicted of corruption only lose a few percentage points in vote 
share in subsequent elections, and can often gain in percentage of vote share.2  
Much political science research focuses on institutional causes of corruption. For 
example, Persson et al (2003) find that larger voting districts are associated with lower 
levels of corruption whereas party lists are associated with higher levels of corruption. 
The authors attribute this to the effects of electoral competition: when there are low 
barriers to entry, voters have a wider range of candidate choice and so can choose clean 
                                                 
1 As quoted in Bracking (2000, p ix). 




candidates. Chang and Golden (2001) find that much political corruption in Italy can be 
attributed to the intraparty competition for electoral funds (at least prior to 1994). 
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that proportional representation systems 
increase corruption – the authors argue that this is because PR systems reduce the ability 
of voters and opposition parties to monitor incumbents.  
In the policy world, the focus has been on transparency. The assumption in much of this 
writing is that the voters are homogenous and universally dislike corruption. If only they 
had more information, they could punish corrupt politicians and levels of corruption 
would be reduced globally. This position often invokes the idea of a virtuous circle that 
begins with transparency and ends with a global Denmark or Sweden where corruption is 
low, transparency is high and institutions seem to work seamlessly. These assumptions 
can be seen in the positions of development agencies such as World Bank and USAID 
among others. Indeed, the importance of the concept of transparency can be seen in the 
name of the primary anti-corruption NGO, Transparency International (founded by a 
former World Bank official, Peter Eigan).  
Bracking (2007) claims that corruption has worsened globally since corruption became a 
priority of the international community after the Cold War. This is despite the millions of 
dollars spent by international organizations, donor governments, and NGOs on programs 
to increase transparency, strengthen civil society and the media, and create anti-
corruption watchdogs (Stapenhurst et al 2006).  
Recent work in political science has turned its focus to the individual to test whether 




support for corrupt politicians. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) field a survey 
experiment in Brazil and find that voters are willing to punish politicians for corrupt 
behavior – and that they are not willing to trade off between corruption and competence. 
Riera et al (2013) find that the effect of corruption on voter support for the incumbent is 
heterogenous across the population. Klasnja (2015) finds a similar result in the United 
States, when he focuses on voter knowledge and the likelihood of voting for a member of 
Congress that has been accused of corruption.   
Researchers have also carried out field studies in order to determine whether increased 
information has an effect on whether voters support the incumbent. Chong et al (2013) 
expose voters in Mexico to information about corrupt mayors and find that information 
does have some effect on incumbent vote share, but also erodes voter identification with 
the incumbent party and causes many to withdraw from the political process. Ferraz and 
Finan (2008) take advantage of the random release of municipal audits in Brazil to 
determine the effect of information on corruption. They find that voters punish 
incumbents when the level of corruption is much higher than voters expected, and that 
this effect is most pronounced in areas with local radio stations to spread the information. 
In effect, they find that voters whose mayors are corrupt may go unpunished. Mayors 
who are not much more corrupt than voters assumed they were get a pass on their 
corruption.  
This brings us to work that has been done on the effect of the political environment on 
the likelihood of voters supporting corrupt politicians. Klašnja and Tucker (2013) carry 
out the same experiment in Moldova and in Sweden to see if there is a cultural difference 




to punish hypothetical corrupt politicians than were Moldovans. While this may be a 
cultural effect, the result squares well with two formal papers on the topic. The first is by 
Klašnja, Little and Tucker (2014) and focuses on political corruption traps. These traps 
are the result of voter choice in corrupt political environments, and candidates’ decision 
to contest elections. Klašnja et al show formally how equilibria of high and low 
corruption can emerge in the same institutions because of voter expectations and so voter 
choice. The second paper is by Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2014) 
who show formally that accountability traps can come about because of ‘bad 
expectations’ about government. The authors describe an accountability trap as a 
situation in which “the voter expects the politician to shirk and the politician expects the 
voter to apply low standards for reelection” (p2). In all three of these papers, as well as in 
the work by Ferraz and Finan, the level of corruption in the political environment is 
important as it is factored into the calculus of the voters. If all actors in the political 
environment are corrupt then punishing a corrupt actor will have little consequence: 
punishing an otherwise competent politician could be harmful as the replacement will 
likely be equally corrupt, but could be far less competent.  
The link between political or institutional trust and corruption has received some 
attention in the political science literature also. Cho and Kirwin (2007) write, “lack of 
confidence in government actually favors corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into 
clients and bribers who look for private protection to gain access to decision-makers” 
(iii). Similarly, Cleary and Stokes (2006) find that low institutional trust increases 
clientelism. However, the link between institutional trust and voting for a corrupt 




Morris and Klesner (2010) argue for mutual causality between institutional trust and 
perceptions of corruption. This raises the prospect of a vicious circle where increased 
perceptions of corruption create lower levels of institutional trust, which becomes the 
lens through which individuals perceive higher levels of corruption. Mishler and Rose 
(2001) present evidence that institutional trust is the result of institutional performance. 
They find no evidence for cultural theories of institutional trust. 3 However, 
Heatherington (1998) finds that low levels of institutional trust make it difficult for 
institutions to perform well (which is required in order to increase institutional trust): 
“low trust helps create a political environment in which it is more difficult for leaders to 
succeed” (p791). Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) find that in countries with low levels of 
corruption, education increases institutional trust, whereas in countries with high levels of 
corruption it has the opposite effect.   
Overall, these studies give us some insight into the importance and origins of political 
trust. I extend this literature by examining the effect of institutional trust on the likelihood 
of supporting a corrupt politician.  
Several other issues related to individual level tolerance of corruption have been explored 
in the literature. The noise surrounding issues of corruption may make assessing 
culpability difficult (Anduiza et al 2014), partisan bias has an effect (Muñoz et al 2013), 
as well as voters’ perceptions of whether they may receive some benefit from the 
corruption (Fernandez-Vasquez et al 2014).  
                                                 
3 The authors also find that with country variation of institutional trust is higher than between country 
variation. This is encouraging as it means that individual level research such as presented in this 
dissertation is valuable as increasing institutional trust at the individual level can have a virtuous effect on 




Separate from voter choice, the tolerance of corruption and likelihood of engaging in 
corruption has been explored by Tavits (2010) in Estonia, and Dong et al (2012) cross-
nationally. Both find that perceptions of corruption in one’s peer group have a strong 
effect on the likelihood of one finding corruption to be justifiable or acceptable. This, in 
turn, increases the likelihood that one engages in some sort of corrupt activity one’s self.  
This dissertation aims to bring together and test several strands of this literature, and test 
hypotheses that have been difficult to test. The first paper sets up an original interactive 
survey that is inspired by research on risk aversion. In this way, I replicate some of the 
real world considerations voters must make: respondents choose between two politicians, 
one of whom is clean but ideologically distant, one of whom is corrupt but ideologically 
close. I show that issue distance and issue salience are important predictors of candidate 
choice. I also show that institutional trust has a conditional effect: high levels of 
institutional trust lessen the effect of issue salience on the likelihood of choosing the 
corrupt politician. And, that perceptions of political corruption have a conditional effect: 
perceiving high levels of corruption strengthens the effect of issue salience on the 
likelihood of choosing a corrupt politician.   
The second paper uses real world data to test whether social norms play a role in an 
individual’s decision to support a corrupt politician. In this case, the politician is Silvio 
Berlusconi. Berlusconi provides a good real world example of the determinants of 
supporting a corrupt politician as he has been charged and convicted several times 
throughout his career and yet has continued to enjoy electoral success. I use the case of 




corruption extend to vote choice: is a person who claims that corruption is justifiable 
more likely to vote for a politician who is corrupt?  
Whether corruption can be justified is itself a result of perceptions of corruption as 
commonplace: those who perceive corruption in their peer groups are more likely to 
claim that corruption can be justified. Thus, if claiming corruption can be justified 
increases the likelihood of voting for a corrupt politician, then we can trace this tolerance 
of political corruption back to the level of corruption in one’s peer group. Indeed, this is 
what I find: respondents who perceive high levels of corruption are more likely to say 
that corruption can be justified, and are in turn more likely to support Silvio Berlusconi.   
I use this opportunity to test two other hypotheses related to Berlusconi specifically. 
Berlusconi has long claimed that he is the victim of persecution by a left wing judiciary 
run amok. I test whether those who believe that the judiciary can be trusted are less likely 
to support Berlusconi (they are not). Because of Berlusconi’s control over the Italian 
media market many commentators attribute his electoral success to his control of the 
Italian media. I test whether those who trust the institution of television are more likely to 
support Berlusconi (they are).  
The third paper takes a slightly different approach. This paper is a survey experiment 
designed to test the effect of political position and political environment on voter 
tolerance of corruption. The survey was carried out at the University of Maryland’s 
Experimental Psychology Laboratory, using a convenience sample consisting of 
undergraduates, graduate students, and university staff. The survey experiment asked 




detailed leaked e-mails showing the corrupt acts of a College Park politician. There were 
two manipulations in the article. Some respondents were told the politician was the 
mayor of College Park, while others were told he was a member of the City Council. In 
addition, some respondents were told that corruption is common in College Park City 
government, while others were told it is not.  
I show that voters will punish corrupt politicians when the environment is clean, but are 
less likely to do so when the political environment is corrupt and the replacement is likely 
to be chosen from that environment. This means that higher level corrupt politicians are 
more shielded from punishment when the environment is corrupt as they are likely to be 
replaced by someone else from this corrupt environment. On the other hand, lower level 
politicians, whose replacements are more likely to be drawn from the public generally, 
are not protected from replacement when the environment is corrupt.  
As this dissertation is formatted as three papers, rather than as a book length manuscript, 
each paper has its own conclusion and discussion section, references section and 
appendix. I have tried to avoid repetition in the literature review sections, and theory 
sections, although a certain amount of repetition is unavoidable, given the closely 
connected nature of the three papers. I include a brief conclusion at the end of the 
dissertation. 
This dissertation therefore makes several contributions to our understanding of when 
voters tolerate corrupt politicians. The first paper (“Dance with the Devil”) finds that 
issue salience causes voters to discount corruption charges against politicians with whom 




has a modifying effect on issue salience: voters with high levels of institutional trust do 
not choose the corrupt politician even when they care deeply about the political issue at 
hand. Furthermore, perceptions of corruption have the opposite effect: issue salience is an 
even stronger predictor when people perceive corruption to be common.   
The second paper (“Norms, Trust and Voting for Berlusconi”) finds that social norms that 
are accepting of corruption extend to voting. Those who perceive corruption as common 
are more likely to find corruption justifiable. These people are in turn far more likely to 
vote for Silvio Berlusconi. At the same time, I find no evidence for a lack of trust in the 
judiciary as being associated with support for Berlusconi. I do find evidence that trust in 
the institution of television increases the likelihood of supporting Berlusconi, as is to be 
expected, given Berlusconi’s control over the Italian media market. 
The third paper (“Political Position and Environment”) finds that voters take into 
consideration the political environment in which a corrupt politician operates. When the 
political environment from which a corrupt politician’s replacement would likely be 
drawn is corrupt, voters are less likely to punish that corrupt politician. In effect, this 
means that politicians at higher level positions will be somewhat insulated from electoral 
punishment when it seems that the replacement would be from the same corrupt 
environment. However, politicians at lower level positions may be easier to punish 
electorally as the replacement may come from outside the corrupt political environment. 
Overall, the dissertation improves our answer to the question ‘why do voters support 







Dance with the Devil: 














Abstract: This paper presents a unique survey experiment that asks respondents to choose 
between pairs of politicians who have different ideological positions, and are accused of 
corruption. The survey goes some way toward recreating the tradeoffs one makes when 
voting in the real world. Results show that voters are more likely to choose corrupt 
politicians who agree with their position on an issue when issue salience is high. Results 
also show that institutional trust decreases the likelihood of choosing a corrupt politician, 
while perceptions of corruption increase the likelihood. Institutional trust and perceptions 




















This paper explores the effect of issue salience on when a survey respondent will choose 
a corrupt politician over a clean one. I show that issue salience increases the extent to 
which respondents discount corruption allegations when choosing between political 
actors: respondents are more likely to choose a politician who agrees with them 
regardless of whether the politician is corrupt, when issue salience is high. Furthermore, I 
show that institutional trust at the individual level decreases the likelihood of choosing a 
corrupt politician, all else equal, while perceiving corruption as common increases the 
likelihood of choosing a corrupt politician. These factors both have a moderating effect 
on issue salience also: voters with high levels of institutional trust, who perceive low 
levels of corruption will punish corrupt politicians even if they agree with them on the 
salient issues. 
I also show that respondents distinguish between different types of corruption, with 
clientelism – or the exchange of material goods for political support (Stokes 2007) – 
being the least frequently punished form of corruption. 
This paper introduces a new approach to measuring when voters discount corruption in 
elected officials. I present a survey instrument in which respondents are presented with a 
series of pairs of politicians. The positions of the politicians on two political issues are 
varied; one of the politicians is corrupt while the other is not. This creates a tension 
where respondents must choose between a corrupt politician who shares their political 
position, and a clean politician who does not. The degree to which the clean politician’s 




This project therefore aims to do several things. Firstly, and most broadly, it aims to help 
us better understand when people are willing to support a corrupt politician. Much 
literature on corruption implies that once voters know that a politician is corrupt they will 
not support him. However, voters who care deeply about one or two issues may continue 
to support a politician who shares their position on these issues regardless of whether he 
is corrupt. Approaching the decision to support a corrupt politician as a tradeoff that takes 
into account the politician’s position on important issues means moving toward a more 
holistic real world understanding of the calculus that voters are faced with when voting.  
Secondly, this project explores whether voters treat different types of corruption 
differently. It stands to reason that voters do: it would be strange if voters treated 
clientelism the same as stealing from the public coffers. Recent research has made some 
strides in understanding how voters distinguish between different types of corruption. I 
build on this work using this new dataset.  
Thirdly, this project explores the effect of the salience of relevant political issues when 
deciding whether to support a corrupt politician. If a politician can cause voters to 
discount his corruption by focusing on an issue about which voters care deeply, he can 
potentially avoid electoral defeat and the consequences of exposure for misdeeds. 
Fourthly, this project tests whether institutional trust at the individual level matters for 
when voters support a corrupt politician. I add to the literature on trust and corruption and 
explore the effect of institutional trust on the likelihood of voting for a politician, as those 
with low levels of institutional trust may feel that supporting a corrupt politician has no 
effect on an already flawed institutional system. I also explore how institutional trust at 




Fifthly, this project tests whether individual perceptions of corruption have an effect on 
voter tolerance of corruption. Work in the sociology literature indicates that higher 
perceptions of corruption lead to an acceptance of corruption as normal. I test whether 
perceiving corruption as common has an effect on the likelihood of supporting a corrupt 
politician, and explore how these perceptions modify the effects of issue salience. 
Literature 
It is well documented that corruption has negative effects on economic growth, support 
for democratic institutions, the allocation of scarce resources, and social trust (Rose-
Ackerman 1999, Cho and Kirwin 2007, Lambsdorf 2005, Uslaner 2008, Clausen et al 
2011). The puzzle of why voters support corrupt politicians is important both for 
theoretical and practical reasons. 
Recent literature on individual level reaction to corruption can be divided into three 
groups. Firstly, field experiments attempt to measure the effects of exposure to 
information about corruption in the real world (Ferraz and Finan 2008, Chong et al 2011). 
These results have shown that exposing voters to information on corrupt politicians has 
some effect, but the results have been somewhat mixed. As is necessarily the case with 
field experiments, controlling for every confounding effect is difficult. In addition, the 
nature of corruption means that there is a lot of noise, misinformation, and bias involved 
in the processing of the information by the voters.  
Other studies have attempted to use survey experiments in the field to ask voters about 
hypothetical politicians in order to determine how averse voters are to corruption 




different effects of corruption on voter perceptions, and have focused on asking 
respondents to choose between hypothetical political candidates.  
A third set of studies emerges from the sociology literature and examines individual 
tendencies to engage in corruption based on the effects of perceptions of corruption and 
the influence of peer groups (Dong et al 2012, Tavits 2010). These highlight the role of 
social groups and social norms in making corruption acceptable, and hence something 
that is heavily discounted when an individual decides whether or not to engage in such 
behavior. Those who perceive corruption in their peer groups are more likely to find such 
behavior acceptable and engage in it themselves. 
In introducing the issue of salience I bring together the corruption literature and the issue 
salience literature for the first time. Many studies argue that salience is an important yet 
under theorized concept in political science (Wlezien 2005, Belanger and Meguid 2008). 
While salience is usually measured by asking respondents what the most important 
problem facing the nation is, I take a different approach. Instead all respondents are faced 
with the same two issues, and I ask respondents to decide on a five point scale how 
important the issue is to them. I also have respondents place themselves on a Guttman 
scale for this issue. In this way I have clear information on both the respondent’s position 
on the issue and how salient the issue is. This is an advantage over the traditional ‘most 
important problem’ approach. For example, a traditional survey that asks about the ‘most 
important problem’ could have two respondents give the same answer, but have vastly 
different positions on this issue. For example, an answer of ‘abortion’ could be because 
the respondent feels that abortions laws are too liberal, or because abortion laws are too 




the respondent believes to be problems in some sense, potentially overlooking issues that 
the respondent may care more about (Wlezien 2005).  
The salience literature is clearly connected to the classic spatial models of voter utility 
that can be traced back to Downs (1957), and has been shown to have an important effect 
on voting behavior (Edwards et al 1995, Fournier et al 2003, Rabinowitz et al 1982). In 
these models a voter maximizes her utility by choosing the candidate that is closest to her 
on a two dimensional issue space (eg, Enelow and Hinnich 1984). I complicate this 
simple model by adding the issue of corruption to the mix. A respondent must choose 
between two political actors while taking into account ideological distance, and that one 
of the actors has been charged with corruption.  
This project therefore relates to several literatures. In creating a survey where 
respondents are forced to decide between a corrupt politician and a clean politician while 
also taking into account the politicians’ position on an issue the respondent cares about I 
aim to create a tension that discourages respondents from defaulting to the socially 
desirable response (that is, the claim that they would never vote for a corrupt politician). 
The socially desirable response becomes less desirable as the pairs of politicians continue 
because the clean politician moves farther away from the respondent, ideologically. 
Therefore, the survey allows us to determine how much distance respondents will tolerate 
between their own position and the clean politician’s position before defecting to the 
corrupt but ideologically close politician. In this survey, a quarter of respondents choose 
a corrupt politician over a clean one at some point.4  
                                                 
4 More specifically, 256/1068 respondents switch to the corrupt politician as soon as the 
clean one differs from them on the salient political issue, in at least one of the series of 




This project engages with the substance of the literature on corruption as it allows us to 
test hypotheses that have been suggested elsewhere, and tested elsewhere, as well as 
bringing hypotheses from the corruption literature generally to bear on corruption and 
voter choice specifically. Results show that voters consider salient political issues when 
deciding whether to support a corrupt politician, and also distinguish between different 
types of corruption. Results also show that an increased perception of corruption 
increases the likelihood of supporting a corrupt politician. Low levels of institutional trust 
also increase this likelihood.  
Research Design 
This project uses a unique online forced choice survey design based on forums such as 
the short-lived social media websites ‘facemash’ and ‘ULiken.net’5 – respondents are 
faced with two fictional politicians and must choose one. The other inspiration for the 
survey is work done on risk aversion and incentive effects by Holt and Laury (2002), 
whereby a person’s risk aversion is measured by moving through pairs of lottery choices 
using the cross-over point to determine risk aversion. In this project, the crossover point 
is used to determine the aversion the respondent has to knowingly choosing a corrupt 
politician: I measure how long a respondent will choose a politician who is ideologically 
dissimilar but uncorrupt before choosing to cross over and ‘dance with the devil.’ 
                                                 
5 Facemash was a predecessor of Facebook. It was set up by Mark Zuckerberg so that 
students at Harvard could compare pictures of Harvard students side by side and choose 
the more attractive of the two. ULiken was based on facemash, but allowed users to 






Prior to Holt and Laury (2002) there had been little experimental work done on risk 
aversion, despite the concept’s importance in many branches of economics. However, 
“the multiple price-list method of Holt and Laury (2002) has become the standard” in 
experimental research on risk aversion (Maier and Ruger 2010). This method lends itself 
nicely to our purposes also. While initially developed to measure aversion to risk it can 
also be used to measure aversion to supporting a corrupt politician. 
This survey asks respondents to place themselves on a Guttman scale related to two 
political issues. Importantly, the Guttman scale is designed so that a person’s views on an 
issue can be scored. For example, instead of asking a respondent if she believes that 
abortion should be legal, a Guttman scale would ask whether a respondent agrees with a 
series of statements. Each statement is designed so that it encompasses the statements 
lower on the scale. For example, on the abortion Guttman scale, a respondent who agrees 
that a woman should legally be allowed to have an abortion if the woman decides she 
cannot afford to support a child would almost certainly also agree that a woman should 
legally be allowed to have an abortion if the pregnancy is the result of rape. The goal of 
the Guttman scale is “to derive a single dimension that can be used to position the 
subjects” on an issue (Abdi 2010). 
Respondents are asked to position themselves on Guttman scales designed to measure 
positions on two political issues: when abortion should legally be available, and when the 
death penalty should be used. This position is then used to determine how long a 
respondent is willing to stick with a clean politician who is increasingly ideologically 
dissimilar before defecting to a corrupt but ideologically similar politician. This survey 




platform.6 Partly for that reason the two issues used are two that cut across national 
politics.  
Most respondents on Mechanical Turk are from the USA or India. Abortion is a 
constantly recurring and contentious political issue in the United States and is often 
central to individual politicians’ platforms. The death penalty is a contentious political 
issue in state politics and its legality and the possibility of being able to execute criminals 
humanely using lethal injection has recently come into question and been dealt with in 
federal courts.  
In India abortion is legal, but is taboo and abortion services are underprovided.7 The 
death penalty is also legal, but the death penalty has only been carried out 54 times since 
Indian independence. There is currently debate as to whether India should ban the death 
penalty altogether, with the country’s highest court indicating that it may be willing to do 
so.8 
Respondents are asked standard demographic information as well as their position on 
Guttman scales for abortion and the death penalty.9 They are also asked how important 
these issues are to them. Respondents are then presented with a pair of politicians. The 
respondent only has one or two pieces of information on the politician: where he stands 
on the salient issue and whether he has been charged with corruption. The respondent 
chooses which she prefers. The initial pair is one where both politicians share the same 
                                                 
6 Mechanical Turk is a service set up by Amazon.com with the purpose of using 
crowdsourcing for Human Intelligence Tasks. It has recently been increasingly used to 









position on the salient issue. However, the respondent is told that one of these politicians 
has been charged with some sort of corruption. Presumably, the respondent chooses the 
politician who has not been charged.10 In the next pair, the corrupt politician remains the 
same, but the clean politician moves one step away from the respondent in the ideological 
space. The respondent now has to decide whether she will choose a corrupt politician 
who shares her ideological position, or a clean politician who differs slightly. The next 
pair again contains the same corrupt politician, but the clean politician is yet another step 
farther in the ideological space.  In this way the design mimics the risk aversion lottery 
pairs used by Holt and Laury (2002) in that it allows us to see when a respondent ‘crosses 
over’ from the clean option to the corrupt option.  
The survey instrument is interactive. For example, the abortion Guttman scale is as 
follows: 
When should a woman legally be allowed to have an abortion? Choose all that 
apply.  
if the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy 
if she became pregnant as a result of rape 
if there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby 
if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children 
if she is not married and does not want to marry the man 
if she is married and does not want any more children 
                                                 
10 Responses where the respondents chose the corrupt politician when both politicians 
had the same position on the salient issue were not counted. While it is possible that one 
might prefer a corrupt candidate over a clean on when both are identical in every other 
way, I took this to be a check on whether the respondent was paying attention to the 





A respondent that chooses the first option only - if the woman's health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy – scores 1 on the Guttman abortion scale. When it comes to 
choosing between pairs of politicians, the respondent is asked to choose between two 
politicians who believe that a woman should never legally be allowed to have an 
abortion. One of these politicians has been charged with corruption. Presumably the 
respondent chooses the politician who has not been charged. 
The next pair the respondent is shown is one in which the clean politician now believes 
that a woman should legally be allowed to have an abortion if her health is seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy, but not in any other case. For this respondent, the clean 
politician now corresponds exactly to what the respondent believes. Presumably the 
respondent once again chooses the clean politician.  
For the next pair of politicians the clean politician once again moves one space on the 
Guttman scale.11 The respondent is now faced with the prospect of choosing a clean 
politician who believes that abortion should legally be allowed under circumstances that 
the respondent disagrees with, and a corrupt politician who does not. This continues until 
the respondent is faced with a clean politician who is at the other end of the Guttman 
scale to the respondent, and a corrupt politician who is much closer.  
For a respondent who answered from 0 to 3 on the Guttman scale, the politicians 
presented are the same as in the example above. For a respondent who answered from 4 
to 6 on the Guttman scale, the opposite is the case: the two politicians initially both 
believe that abortion should legally be allowed under all circumstances.  
                                                 





Snapshot of a typical pair presented to the respondent. 
As mentioned above, recent work has shown that people may not respond similarly to all 
types of corruption. Bribery is different from clientelism. For this reason the lists are 
repeated using several different types of corruption. This will allow us to determine 
whether there is variation in how different types of people react to different types of 
corruption, as well as increase the data available for analysis.  
There are three types of corruption used. All respondents are exposed to all three types, 
using both the Guttman abortion scale, and the Guttman death penalty scale. The three 
types of corruption used are clientelism, accepting a bribe from a private business man 
(which I term private corruption), and using public funds for personal use (which I term 
public corruption). This means that each respondent is presented with six sets of pairs. 
The survey was fielded on the Mechanical Turk platform in December 2014. This is an 
online platform designed originally to recruit people to perform human intelligence tasks. 
As such, the survey was accessible to anyone in the world with internet access and a 
Mechanical Turk account. This allowed me to collect a large number of respondents from 
several countries. Previous work has shown that Mechanical Turk users are mostly from 




countries (Ross et al 2010). My sample was comparable with 64% of respondents being 
from the USA and 30% from India. This essentially provides me with variation on the 
‘culture of corruption’ that would otherwise be impossible without expensive and lengthy 
field work. There have been several recent studies that advocate the use of Mechanical 
Turk for social science research (Horton et al 2010, Berinsky et al 2012). 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Recent research has examined the effects of different types of corruption on when voters 
will punish corrupt politicians.  This has generally been framed as a dichotomy between 
clientelism and private enrichment. Clientelism is the exchange of material goods for 
political support (Stokes 2007), while private enrichment is the abuse of public office to 
increase one’s personal wealth (Johnston 2009). Gamboa et al (2014) point out that 
clientelism, while a misuse of state resources, does not enrich the politician indirectly. 
The resources are generally used to build support rather than line the pockets of the 
politician, per se. However, private enrichment means that the politician is benefitting 
only himself – the party is not built up, nor are jobs being handed out (although 
presumably these jobs will still be offered to people, but the offers will be based on merit 
rather than party allegiance).  
Indeed, Peters and Welch (1980) and Welch and Hibbing (1997) show that not all 
corruption charges have the same effect. They argue that voters react more negatively to 
‘moral charges’ than other charges such as bribery and conflict of interest.  
I further this strand of research by choosing three different types of corruption, with 




clientelism. Respondents are told that the politician is charged with “misuse of power for 
giving government jobs to his supporters.”  
For the other two types of corruption I distinguish between private enrichment where the 
money is being given to the politician by a private person (which I term private 
corruption), and enrichment where the money in question is public money (which I term 
public corruption). For the former, respondents are told that the politician “has been 
charged with accepting bribes to provide legislation favorable to certain business people.” 
For the latter, the respondent is told the politician “has been charged with stealing public 
money for private use.” 
Following the logic laid out in Gamboa et al (2014) I expect respondents to be least 
concerned with clientelism. In the case of clientelism the politician is not enriching 
himself directly, and while clientelism likely means that the state is employing people 
that are underqualified, the effects of this are not obvious to most people. Indeed some 
may be part of the group that benefits from such jobs. Recent studies have argued that 
voters’ reactions to corruption are contingent on the benefits received from the corrupt 
government (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, Fernandez-Vasquez et al 2015). As clientelism 
is a form of corruption from which a large number of people potentially benefit, voters 
may be more willing to overlook it. Indeed, many voters do not perceive clientelism as a 
form of corruption at all (Weitz-Shapiro 2012).  
I expect respondents to be more concerned with private corruption than with clientelism, 
but less concerned with private corruption than with public corruption. In the case of 
private corruption, while the politician is directly profiting, the public is not directly 




exchange is such that it is difficult to pinpoint a loser. While the particular businessman 
who paid the bribe will gain an advantage, it is not clear that any other businessman 
loses. And, it may be that the businessman would have gained this advantage anyway, 
albeit more slowly. Thus, in this second type of corruption, although the politician 
benefits directly in a clear financial way, there is not a clear loser as a result of the 
politician’s actions. 
The third type of corruption, public corruption, should be the one which concerns 
respondents the most. In this case the politician is benefiting financially in a direct way 
and there is a clear loser – the public purse. As this can be seen as ‘our money’, 
belonging to the public as a whole, I expect respondents to be most hesitant to switch to a 
politician accused of this type of corruption.  
Thus, I propose the first set of hypotheses: 
H1a: Voters are less concerned with clientelism than with other types of corruption. 
H1b: Voters are less concerned with bribe-taking from the private sector than with 
corrupt use of state funds. 
Policy makers often focus on increasing transparency as a way to decrease corruption (eg, 
Stapenhurst et al 2006). The story goes that this increase in transparency leads to an 
increase in information available to the voters, who are then better able to choose the best 
candidates in elections. However, this literature often neglects the fact that voters do not 
vote on the basis of corruption alone. Indeed, voters may well discount corruption 
charges and allegations as irrelevant when choosing which politician to support. At the 
very least, the salient political issues in an electoral competition will be taken into 




corruption researchers must take a holistic approach to the effect of information on 
corruption on voter behavior and that the effect will vary depending on the issue salience.  
Therefore I test whether higher issue salience affects the point at which respondents 
choose a corrupt politician over a clean politician. That is, I test whether a respondent 
who feels strongly on the death penalty issue is more likely to choose a corrupt politician 
over a clean one compared to a respondent who has the same position on the issue, but 
who does not feel as strongly.  
I propose that respondents’ tolerance for corruption will vary with the salience of the 
relevant political issue. This means that respondents for whom the political issue at hand 
is highly salient will discount the corruption allegations against the politician who agrees 
with their position. In effect, high salience means that respondents will be more likely to 
choose the corrupt politician over the clean one. 
This is in keeping with recent research that shows that issue ownership by parties is only 
influential on voter behavior when that issue is salient (Belanger and Meguid 2008). The 
distance between the voter and the candidate or party does not matter if the issue is not 
important to the voter. Equally, here, the distance between the clean candidate and the 
respondent should not matter unless the issue at hand is highly salient. If it is not, the 
respondent will simply choose the clean but ideologically distant candidate over the 
corrupt but ideologically close candidate.  
H2: High issue salience will increase the likelihood of a voter choosing the corrupt but 
ideologically close politician over the clean but ideologically distant politician.  
There is a large literature on institutional trust and corruption. Research shows that voters 




countries with higher levels of corruption (Anderson and Tverdova 2003), and that lower 
levels of institutional trust at the individual level encourage people to engage in 
corruption (Cho and Kirwin 2007). 
In this paper I take a different approach, and test the effect of institutional trust on the 
likelihood of a respondent voting for a corrupt politician. High levels of institutional trust 
at the individual level should mean that the person is less accepting of corruption. If 
institutions work well then there is no excuse for corruption. On the other hand, if one has 
little faith in institutions then empowering a corrupt political actor is not something to be 
avoided: there is no need to be concerned for the integrity of these institutions if one 
believes them to already be untrustworthy.12 
In keeping with Torgler (2007), “trust in the state might tend to increase citizens’ positive 
attitudes and commitment to the rules of a society, which ultimately has a negative effect 
on illegal activities.” The idea of greasing the wheels or of having to engage in shady 
dealings to get things done is not plausible for those who have high levels of institutional 
trust. On the other hand, if one does not have trust in institutions then breaking the rules 
of these institutions is not seen as being as blameworthy – low levels of institutional trust 
at the individual level should make a person more tolerant of corruption and more likely 
to choose the corrupt politician over the clean one, all else equal.  
                                                 
12 By institutions here I mean the institutions that the political actor will be part of and 
have some control over. For example, the fact that many electoral institutions can censure 
and expel members for conduct unbecoming of the body highlights the idea that 
institutional integrity is maintained by controlling membership in these bodies. A recent 
example in the US Senate was Bob Packwood: the Oregan Senator was recommended for 
expulsion by the Senate Ethics Committee after allegations of sexual harassment. The 
Senator resigned instead. (http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/07/us/packwood-case-
overview-ethics-committee-6-0-asks-senate-oust-packwood-he-vows.html Accessed 




H3: Voters with high levels of institutional trust are less likely to support a corrupt 
politician. 
Theories of pro-social behavior and how the actions of others affect one’s attitudes and 
actions have shown that the behavior of others has an effect on whether one complies 
with the tax code (Frey and Torgler 2007), norms against littering (Frey, Torgler and 
Wilson 2009), or whether one engages in criminal behavior generally (Kahan 1998).  
Tavits (2010) shows that people are more likely to engage in corruption when they 
perceive corruption as widespread. A recent paper by Dong, Dulleck and Torgler (2012) 
shows that people are more likely to consider corruption to be justifiable when they 
perceive corruption as being common.13 However, we do not know how the perceived 
level of corruption affects voter behavior.  
I hypothesize that perceiving corruption as common will make voters more tolerant of 
corrupt politicians. This is contrary to the claims of policy experts and researchers who 
argue for increased voter information as a panacea for corruption (Stapenhurst et al 2006, 
Persson and Tabellini 2000). In a world in which corruption is seen as common, choosing 
a clean politician who is ideologically distant over a corrupt politician who is 
ideologically close makes little sense. Corruption is so common in this world that having 
one clean political actor will likely make little difference. And, choosing a clean actor 
that does not share your position on an important issue may do you more harm than good.  
The social norms theory posits that when corruption is common, the more information we 
have about corruption the more corruption becomes normalized and acceptable. The 
                                                 
13 These papers look at people’s perceptions of corruption amongst the population 
generally, not specifically at political corruption. For example, bribing a police officer is 




information theory posits that when corruption is common, the more information we have 
about corruption the more we can and so will act against corruption. 
In keeping with the Dong et al (2012) paper, I measure the respondents’ perceptions of 
corruption in general.14 I expect each of these to have a positive effect on respondents’ 
acceptance of corruption. That is, respondents who perceive more corruption will be 
more likely to defect to the corrupt politician than those who perceive less corruption.  
H4: People who perceive corruption as common are more likely to support a corrupt 
politician. 
I also propose that institutional trust and perceptions of corruption should have a 
modifying effect on the effect of issue salience on the likelihood of voting for a corrupt 
politician. When institutional trust is high, the effect of salience should be lessened: 
institutional trust ought to have a negative effect on issue salience. Equally, when 
perceptions of corruption are high, the effect of salience should be increased: high 
perceptions of corruption ought to have a positive effect on issue salience. 
H5: Institutional trust has a negative effect on the effect of issue salience. 
H6: Perceptions of corruption have a positive effect on the effect of issue salience.  
Results 
Types of Corruption: Clientelism 
The first hypothesis relates to the type of corruption of which the politician is accused. I 
propose that people distinguish between different types of corruption. I also propose, 
                                                 
14 The question is taken from the European Values Survey. “According to you, how many 





based on the literature, that people are less concerned with clientelism than with other 
types of corruption.  
For this analysis I created a series of binary variables, scored as 0 if the respondent 
switched to the corrupt politician as soon as the clean politician deviates from the 
respondent’s position on the Guttman scale, and scored as 1 if the respondent stayed with 
the clean politician for at least one round beyond this point. Using these variables allows 
us to compare when respondents switched in the clientelism treatment versus the other 
treatments. 15   
I begin by examining the results from the series of pairs where respondents had 
information about the politicians’ positions on abortion. Respondents in the clientelism 
treatment switched once they did not agree with the clean politician 29% of the time. This 
is compared to 26% of the time for the private corruption section, and 25% for the public 
corruption section. The difference in means between the clientelism and private 
corruption groups is three percentage points, but the difference is outside of statistical 
significance (p= .15 for a one-tailed test). However, the difference in means between the 
clientelism and public corruption groups is four percentage points, and is significant at 
95% confidence (p = .05, one-tailed test).  
Looking to the death penalty groups, we can once again compare when respondents 
switched in the clientelism treatment versus the private corruption treatment.  
Respondents in the clientelism treatment switched once they did not agree with the clean 
politician 10% of the time. This is compared to 8% of the time for the private corruption 
                                                 
15 These are binary variables, coded as 0 if the respondent switched to the corrupt 
politician in the first pair in which the clean politician disagreed with the respondent’s 
position. The variable is coded as 1 if the respondent stayed with the clean politician for 




section, and 6% for the public corruption section. The difference in means between the 
clientelism and private corruption groups is two percentage points, but the difference is 
outside of statistical significance (p= .13 for a one-tailed test). However, the difference in 
means between the clientelism and public corruption groups is 4%, and is significant at 
99% confidence (p = .005, one-tailed test).  
Therefore in both the abortion group and the death penalty group, clientelism is the form 
of corruption with which respondents are least concerned. Although the difference 
between the clientelism treatment and the private corruption treatment is not statistically 
significant, the difference between the clientelism treatment and the public corruption 
treatment is four percentage points, and statistically significant, in both cases. Thus I find 
evidence in support of H1a: People are less concerned with clientelism than with other 
types of corruption.  
 
Types of Corruption: Bribery and the Private Sector  
To further understand whether and how people distinguish between different types of 
corruption, I propose that respondents will be less concerned with bribe-taking from the 
private sector than with corrupt use of state funds.  
Looking again at the difference in means of binary variables that are coded as 0 if the 
respondent switched to the corrupt politician as soon as she did not agree fully with the 
clean politician, I compare when respondents switched in the private corruption treatment 
versus the public corruption treatment. 
Once again, I begin by examining the results from the abortion series of politicians. 




politician 26% of the time. This is compared to 25% of the time for the abortion/public 
corruption treatment. The difference in means between the clientelism and private 
corruption groups is therefore one percentage point, but the difference is outside of 
statistical significance (p= .27 for a one-tailed test).  
Looking to the death penalty series, respondents in the private corruption treatment 
switched once they did not agree with the clean politician 8% of the time. This is 
compared to 6% of the time for the public corruption treatment. The difference in means 
between the clientelism and private corruption groups is two and a half percentage points, 
and statistically significant at 95% confidence (p= .04 for a one-tailed test).  
Therefore in both the abortion group and the death penalty group, respondents punish 
bribe taking from a private person less than taking public money for private means. 
However, this is only statistically significant for the death penalty group, and is of small 
substantive significance.  
Nonetheless this is evidence in support of H2b: People are less concerned with bribe-
taking from the private sector than with corrupt use of state funds.  
Overall, these two results indicate that a voter is less likely to punish a politician charged 
with clientelism than a politician charged with accepting bribes or stealing from the 
public coffers. And, a voter is less likely to punish a politician charged with accepting 
bribes from private individuals than a politician charged with stealing from the public 
coffers.  
 
Salience of Political Issues 
Do people consider salient political issues when deciding whether or not to support a 




how often a respondent chose the clean politician over the corrupt politician.16 As there 
are two political issues (abortion and the death penalty), I estimate the two OLS models 
separately. I include a measure for issue salience and standard demographic variables.17 
As respondents are from several countries, but mainly from the United States, I also 
control for being from the US.18  
Results show that issue salience has a strong negative effect on how often respondents 
chose the clean politician (Table 1).19  
Looking at the marginal effects of issue salience in this model, a respondent for whom 
abortion is not a salient issue (someone with 0 on the abortion salience scale) would 
choose the clean politician 8.2 times on average (score 8.2 on the dependent variable), 
holding all other variables at their means. On the other hand, a respondent for whom 
abortion is a very salient issue (someone with 4 on the abortion salience scale) would 
choose the clean politician 4.5 times on average, holding all other variables at their 
means.20  When respondents care more about abortion they are much more likely to 
choose the corrupt politician who agrees with them on the issue, over a clean politician 
who does not. 
                                                 
16 That is, how many times the respondent chose the clean politician over the corrupt 
politician once the clean politician differed from their position on the political issue at 
hand. This means that respondents do not get credit for choosing a clean politician who 
agrees with them fully on the political issue – only for choosing a clean politician who 
disagrees with them to some extent. Scoring this way also means that the respondent’s 
position on the political issue is held constant.  
17 As demographic controls I use measures for age, gender, education and income in all 
models.  
18 I also estimate the model using a dummy variable for India. See Appendix Table 1. 
19 Being from the US also has a negative effect on the score in the abortion model. This 
could reflect the high salience of this issue in US politics.  
20 The dependent variable in the abortion model goes from 0 for respondents who never 
chose the clean politician, to 9 for respondents who chose the clean politician the 





Table 1: Issue Salience 
    Abortion Model Death Penalty Model 
Issue Salience -0.9295*** -.3188*** 
 
(.1527) (.0021) 
Age .0189 .0021 
 
(.0120) (.0050) 
Gender (female) -0.4246 .0334 
 
(.3314) (.1338) 
Education -.1208 -.0033 
 
(.0900) (.0363) 
Income -.0058 .0182 
 
(.0890) (.0376) 
USA -1.921*** -.1652 
 
(.3982) (0.1780) 
Constant 10.2221*** 5.8866*** 
 
(1.0355) (.4428) 
Observations 550 519 
R-squared 0.128 0.0314 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 (tests are one-tailed for salience variables only) 
 
Looking at the marginal effects of issue salience in this model, a respondent for whom 
the death penalty is not a salient issue would choose the clean politician an average of 6 
times, holding all other variables at their means. On the other hand, a respondent for 
whom the death penalty is a very salient issue would only choose the clean politician 4.6 
times on average, holding all other variables at their means. 21 When respondents care 
more about the death penalty they are much more likely to choose the corrupt politician 
who agrees with them on the issue, over a clean politician who does not.   
                                                 
21 The dependent variable for the death penalty model goes from 0 for respondents who 
never chose the clean politician to 6 for respondents who chose the clean politician the 
maximum number of times. The maximum score possible for the death penalty DV is 
lower because the Guttman scale for the death penalty has fewer options. This translates 
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Figure 1. Graphs showing the marginal effects of issue salience on a measure of how 
often the respondent chose the clean but ideologically distant politician over a corrupt but 
ideologically close politician. Respondents who chose the corrupt politician every time 
are scored as 0.  
 
This provides strong evidence in support of H2: High issue salience increases the 
likelihood of a voter choosing a corrupt but ideologically close politician over a clean but 
ideologically distant politician. In both the abortion and the death penalty series issue 
salience has a substantively strong and statistically significant effect on how respondents 
discount corruption.  
 
Trust and Voting 
In order to determine the effect of institutional trust on whether a respondent chooses a 




the two models above. Therefore the new dependent variable scores as 0 respondents who 
never chose the clean politician once the clean politician disagreed with them, and scores 
as 15 respondents who chose the clean politician every time.22  
I retest the effect of salience on this new measure. I estimate a model that includes the 
same demographic controls as the models above, and includes a measure of salience.23 
Results show that salience has the same effect in this model as in the previous section (p= 
.00, one-tailed): voters who care about the issues choose the clean politician less often. 
The marginal effect of salience – moving from the lowest level of salience to the highest 
– is 2.5 points on the 16 point measure of how often respondents chose the clean 
politician.  
In order to determine whether people with high levels of trust are less likely to support a 
corrupt politician, I estimate the same OLS model as above and add a variable for 
institutional trust.  
The institutional trust variable is a score for each respondent based on how trustworthy 
the respondent believes several institutions in her country to be. These institutions were 
the national government, state government, local government, political parties, police and 
                                                 
22 The dependent variable for this model consists of the scores for each of the six 
treatments that each respondent was exposed to. Because of listwise deletion the number 
of respondents in the sample is reduced to 412. This new variable allows me to test the 
effect of institutional trust (and perceptions of corruption) in one model instead of testing 
everything in two models. Combining the data should also give a better estimate of the 
effect of these variables of interest. 
23 The salience variable used here is the sum of the abortion and death penalty variables. 
This is for the sake of simplicity in that it allows me to have one salience variable instead 




the courts. This score therefore goes from 0 for absolutely no trust in any of these 
institutions to 60 for maximum trust in these institutions.24  
 
Table 2: Institutional Trust and Perceptions of Corruption 
   Base Model Trust Model Perceptions Model 
Issue Salience -.5953*** -.6010*** -.5701*** 
 







 Perceptions of Corruption 
  
-.4977* 
   
(.3328) 
Age .0385** .0319* .0345 
 
(.0166) (.0171) (.0168) 
Gender (female) -.5875 -.6023 -.5412 
 
(.4635) (.4661) (.4638) 
Education -.0758 -.0815 -.0851 
 
(.1258) (.1262) (.1256) 
Income .1009 .0411 .1008 
 
(.1262) (.1314_ (.1260) 
USA -2.096 -1.998 -2.433 
 
(.6162) (.6325) (.6553) 
Constant 14.3821*** 13.9997*** 15.9081*** 
 
(1.5205) (1.5495) (1.8292) 
Observations 418 413 418 
R-squared 0.0897 0.088 0.107  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1  
(tests are one-tailed for salience, trust and perception variables only) 
  
Results show (Table 2), institutional trust has a significant and positive effect on how 
often the respondent chooses the clean politician (p= .03, one-tailed): respondents with 
higher institutional trust chose the clean politician more often. Looking at the marginal 
effect of institutional trust in this model, a respondent who has the lowest level of 
institutional trust chooses the clean politician 10 times on average, while a respondent 
                                                 




who has the highest level of institutional trust chooses the clean politician 12 times on 
average, holding all other variables at their means. 
Overall, this is strong evidence in favor of H3: Voters with high levels of institutional 
trust are less likely to support a corrupt politician. 
 
Perceptions of Corruption 
Work in sociology and economics has shown that perceiving corruption to be common 
increases an individual’s tolerance of corruption. I extend this literature by proposing that 
the same mechanism makes one more tolerant of corrupt politicians. Thus I propose that 
perceiving corruption as common amongst the population in general strengthens the norm 
of corruption as acceptable. Following Dong et al (2012), in this model I operationalize 
perceptions of corruption with a measure of how common the respondent perceives bribe 
taking to be amongst the population in general.25   
Results show (Table 2) that the variable is significant and in the expected direction (p= 
.06, one-tailed). 26 Looking at the marginal effect of the perception of corruption variable, 
a respondent who perceives the lowest amount of corruption chooses the clean politician 
12 times on average, holding all other variables at their means. On the other hand, a 
respondent who perceives the highest amount of corruption only chooses the clean 
politician 10 times on average, holding all other variables at their means. This means that 
                                                 
25 According to you, how many of your compatriots accept bribes in the course of their 
duties? Almost all; A lot; Very few; Almost none. The variable is reordered to that 4 is 
the highest perception of corruption, and 1 is the lowest. 
26 I also estimate models using a dummy variable for India. See Appendix Table 2. I also 
estimate models for the institutional trust and perceptions of corruption variable without 
the salience variable. In addition, I estimate a model that includes both institutional trust 
and perceptions of corruption. The results are robust to these different specifications. See 




perceiving corruption as common resulted in respondents choosing the clean politician 
less often than they otherwise would (or choosing the corrupt politician more often than 
they otherwise would).  
Therefore I find strong evidence in support of H4: People who perceive corruption as 
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Figure 2. Two way graph showing the effects of institutional trust and perceptions of 
corruption on respondents scores on the dependent variable used in Table 2. The 
dependent variable scores respondents on how many times they chose the clean politician 












The Moderating Effects of Institutional Trust and Perceptions of Corruption  
Finally I test the conditional effect of institutional trust and perceptions of corruption on 
issue salience.27 Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of issue salience is negative 
when institutional trust is low, but moves closer to zero as trust increase. For a 
respondent with 0 out of 60 on the measure of institutional trust, the marginal effect of 
issue salience is -.87. For a respondent with 45 out of 60 on the measure of institutional 
trust, the marginal effect of issue salience is-.40. Beyond this point, the effect of issue 
salience is statistically indistinguishable from 0. That is, the effect of issue salience is 
statistically insignificant when institutional trust is high.  
What this means it that, for people who have low levels of institutional trust, caring about 
the issue is a good predictor of how often they will choose the corrupt politician. But, for 
people with high levels of institutional trust, this is not the case. The effect of high 
institutional trust cancels out the effect of issue salience.  
By contrast, the graph on the right in Figure 3 shows that perceptions of corruption have 
the opposite effect on issue salience. The effect of issue salience is insignificant when 
perceptions of corruption are at their lowest, but the effect of issue salience is statistically 
significant once the respondent scores 2 out of 4 or above on the measure of perceptions 
of corruption. Higher perceptions of corruption also substantively increase the effect of 
issue salience on how often the respondent chooses a clean politician. For a respondent 
who scores 2 out of 4 on the perceptions of corruption measure issue salience has a 
marginal effect of -.51. For a respondent who scores 4 out of 4 on the perceptions of 
corruption measure salience has a marginal effect of -.91. 
                                                 
27 I focus here on the graphical representation of these results. For the regression output, 




This means that, for people who perceive very little corruption, how much a respondent 
cares about the issues is not a good predictor of how often a respondent chooses the clean 
politician. But, when a respondent perceives a lot of corruption, how much a respondent 
cares about the issues is an important predictor of how often she chooses the clean 
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Figure 3. The marginal effect of issue salience on how often a respondent chose a clean 
politician. The left graph illustrates how the effect of issue salience changes with 
institutional trust. The right graph illustrates how the effect of issue salience changes with 
perceptions of corruption. 
 
These results show that although issue salience is a powerful predictor of when a 
respondent will choose a corrupt but ideologically close politician over a clean but 
ideologically distant politician, the effect of issue salience is conditional on other factors. 




voters need not rule the day. Indeed, issue salience becomes statistically insignificant in 
this model once institutional trust is high, or perceptions of corruption are low.  
What this means is that voters with high levels of institutional trust, and who perceive 
low levels of corruption will punish corrupt politicians even if they agree with them on 
the salient issues. The marginal effect of issue salience is -1 and statistically significant at 
99% confidence when both institutional trust is at its highest and perceptions of 
corruption are at their lowest. This is reduced to a statistically insignificant -.08 when 
institutional trust is at its lowest, and perceptions of corruption at their highest.   
Therefore, I find strong evidence in favor of H5: Institutional trust has a negative effect 
on the effect of issue salience. I also find strong evidence in favor of H6: Perceptions of 
corruption have a positive effect on the effect of issue salience.  
Discussion 
This paper presents an innovative survey design that asks respondents to choose between 
an ideologically close but corrupt political actor and an ideologically distant but clean 
political actor. Doing so builds on work on spatial models of voter choice, and research 
on issue salience, and goes some way toward recreating the calculus that voters make 
when choosing between less than ideal candidates in the real world. Thus, the survey 
allows us to get some insight into how heavily voters weigh corruption relative to other 
salient issues.  
Results presented here also show that voters distinguish between different types of 
corruption in a predictable way. Clientelism is seen as the least egregious of the offences, 





More importantly, results presented here indicate that respondents do take the salient 
political issues into account when deciding whether to support a corrupt politician. This 
goes beyond hopeful stylized facts regarding increasing information available to voters. 
Since many voters are not willing to trade off on ideological issues because of corruption, 
politicians may often be able to shield themselves from electoral defeat by moving into 
an ideological space that is important to voters, or by highlighting issues that voters 
believe to be more important than corruption. Indeed, research on issue trespassing has 
shown that candidates are more likely to do so when they are trailing in a campaign, and 
when an issue is particularly important to the electorate (Damore 2004). 
Respondents who had high levels of institutional trust chose the clean politician over the 
corrupt politician more often, all else equal. This is important as strengthening the rule of 
law – and so, trust in institutions – may be key to reducing voter tolerance of corruption. 
However, this is complicated by the fact that research has shown a possible negative 
effect of corruption on trust in public institutions (Clausen et al 2011) and regime 
legitimacy (Seligson 2002) at the national level. This result is also in keeping with other 
research on political trust and corruption.  
Perceiving corruption as common was a significant predictor of whether the respondent 
chose the corrupt politician. This result extends the literature on social norms and 
corruption and highlights the importance of work in sociology and criminology that link 
the social norms of one’s peer group to larger social issues (eg, Fisman and Miguel 
2008). This also highlights the potential importance of sociological theories such as the 
‘broken window’ theory of law enforcement (Kelling 1996) to dealing with apparently 




peer group could have a positive effect if it ‘filters up’ to a reduced tolerance for 
corruption amongst elected politicians.   
Institutional trust and perceptions of corruption had moderating effects on issue salience 
as a predictor of choice of politician. The effect of issue salience was weakened to the 
point of insignificance when institutional trust was high. Issue salience was made 
insignificant by low perceptions of corruption. These results are important as they offer 
some hope for the prospect of voters punishing corrupt political actors, even if the 
political actors correctly choose issue positions that are salient for the electorate. Voters 
with high levels of institutional trust, and who perceive low levels of corruption will 
punish corrupt politicians even if they agree with them on the salient issues.  
Therefore, policy makers should move beyond transparency in order to increase the 
likelihood of corrupt politicians being punished at the polls. Anti-corruption NGOs and 
advocates may need to move their focus to improving people’s trust in their institutions 
as a means to increasing the likelihood that corrupt politicians will be punished. 
Transparency in itself may be useless if corrupt politicians cleverly choose their positions 
on salient issues, or if voters mistrust a state’s institutions, or perceive corruption as 
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Appendix 1: Guttman Scales 
 
When should a woman be legally allowed to have an abortion? Choose all that apply. If 
you do not agree with any of the statements, you need not choose any.  
if the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy 
if she became pregnant as a result of rape 
if there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby 
if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children 
if she is not married and does not want to marry the man 




When, if ever, should capital punishment (the death penalty) be used? Choose all that 
apply. If you do not agree with any of the statements, you need not choose any.  
Capital punishment is justified for the most extreme crimes (e.g., multiple murders) 
Capital punishment is justified for the crime of premeditated murderer 
Capital punishment is just and necessary 
























Appendix 2: Alternate Specifications of Models 
 
Appendix Table 1: Issue Salience (with India control variable) 
  Abortion Model Death Penalty Model 
Issue Salience -0.9898*** -.3268*** 
 
(.1528) (.0020) 
Age .0174 .0021 
 
(.0120) (.0050) 
Gender (female) -0.3938 .0457 
 
(.3308) (.1337) 
Education -.1272 -.0056 
 
(.0897) (.0361) 
Income -.0131 .0144 
 
(.0888) (.0376) 
India 2.337*** -.2978 
 
(.4515) (0.2029) 
Constant 8.6282*** 5.7645*** 
 
(.9357) (.3849) 
Observations 550 519 
R-squared 0.1340 0.0450 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1  

























Appendix Table 2: Institutional Trust and Perceptions of Corruption  
(with India control variable) 
  Base Model Trust Model Perceptions Model 
Issue Salience -.6337*** -.6379*** -.6118*** 
 







 Perceptions of Corruption 
  
-.5084* 
   
(.3372) 
Age .0385** .0307* .0320 
 
(.0166) (.0171) (.0168) 
Gender (female) -.4993 -.4952 -.4509 
 
(.4632) (.4654) (.4635) 
Education -.0788 -.0897 -.0863 
 
(.1249) (.1252) (.1248) 
Income .0841 .0259 .0841 
 
(.1259) (.1307) (.1257) 
India 2.912 2.906 3.28 
 
(.7335) (.7421) (.7708) 
Constant 12.6268*** 12.4177*** 13.8672*** 
 
(1.3259) (1.353) (1.5458) 
Observations 418 413 418 
R-squared 0.1116 0.116 0.1168 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1  






















Appendix Table 3: Trust and Perceptions Models without Issue Salience Variable 
  
Trust 
Model Perceptions Model Trust and Perceptions 












Age .0364* .0363 .0330* 
 
(.0174) (.0171) (.0176) 
Gender (female) -1.251*** -1.1383 -1.1490*** 
 
(.4529) (.4506) (.4557) 
Education -.0849 -.0924 -.0949 
 
(.1291) (.1283) (.1289) 
Income -.0023 .0520 .0135 
 
(.1341) (.1280) (.1341) 
USA -1.8261*** -2.4024*** -2.235*** 
 
(.6452) (.6681) (.6859) 
Constant 11.5477*** 14.1839*** 12.5794*** 
 
(1.485) (1.821) (1.8932) 
Observations 414 419 414 
R-squared 0.0584 0.0536 0.0652 
Standard errors in parentheses. 

























Appendix Table 4: Modifying effect of Institutional Trust and Perceptions of 
Corruption on Issue Salience (see Figure 3 in the main body of the paper) 
  Interaction Model 
Issue Salience -.4659 
 
(.5136) 
Institutional Trust -.0127 
 
(.0497) 
Perceptions of Corruption .3022 
 
(.8555) 
Trust*Issue Salience .0087 
 
(.0098) 























Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1  




































Abstract: This paper uses several datasets to test the effects of several mechanisms on the 
likelihood of a person voting for Silvio Berlusconi. Taking Berlusconi as the archetypal 
corrupt yet electorally successful politician I show that social norms that justify 
corruption in one’s peer group extend to voting and increase the likelihood of supporting 
Berlusconi. I find that perceptions of political corruption have an effect on the likelihood 
of supporting Berlusconi, and that this effect is not constant over time. I also find that 
trust in the judiciary has no effect on the likelihood of supporting Berlusconi – contrary 
to Berlusconi’s claims of persecution by the judiciary – and that trusting the institution of 

















This paper is a case study of the Italian politician Silvio Berlusconi. It is difficult to find 
an example of a politician who has been repeatedly accused of and even charged with 
corruption, who has both been repeatedly elected and on whom there exists a reasonable 
amount of data (or rather on whose supporters there exists a reasonable amount of data).  
Berlusconi fits the bill for this type of case study for several reasons. The first is that his 
corruption is undeniable. Although he may be better known for philandering, and making 
gaffes on the international stage, he has clearly also been active in using political power 
for personal gain – a standard definition of political corruption. The second is that his 
political party is essentially a personal vehicle for his political ambition. It is hard to 
imagine someone who supports Berlusconi’s party, but not him – indeed in the 1996 
elections, Berlusconi’s was the only face allowed on any Forza Italia campaign material. 
What this means is that national Italian data can be used when exploring support for 
Berlusconi. In other countries, and other electoral systems, one might be limited to 
merely using data on one constituency – not so in this case.  
The question that this case allows us to answer is why do people vote for a politician who 
is corrupt? The literature on corruption gives us some suggestions.  
Recent cross national survey work has shown that those who perceive high levels of 
corruption are more likely to claim that corruption can be justified, and so engage in 
corrupt acts themselves (Tavits 2010, Dong et al 2012). I propose that this will affect 
voting: those who perceive corruption as common will be more likely to vote for 




I claim that perceiving high levels of political corruption will cause voters to discount 
political corruption and so be more likely to support Berlusconi. 
A separate strand of research on corruption posits that when voters have information 
about corruption, they will punish corrupt politicians: in this model, it is only the lack of 
information that prevents voters from pushing for good clean governance (eg, Persson 
and Tabellini 2000). The observable implications of this model are clear, and appear to be 
in conflict with the positions outlined above: once a voter knows that Berlusconi is 
corrupt, she will not vote for him. While the surveys available do not ask whether a 
respondent believes Berlusconi to be corrupt, 28 one survey does ask about the extent to 
which the respondent trusts the institution of television. As Berlusconi controls most of 
the television market in Italy, we can take this question to be a measure of the extent to 
which the respondent is getting good, objective information about Berlusconi and politics 
generally.  
Berlusconi has long claimed that he is the victim of persecution by left wing judges with 
an axe to grind. This is often reported in the international media as the myth that allows 
Berlusconi to dupe Italians into voting for him. The veracity of this claim can be tested 
here. This is really an extension of the standard ‘information model’, that voters will 
punish politicians whom they believe to be corrupt: the idea that Berlusconi has done 
nothing wrong and yet is being pursued by prosecutors is clearly false – an example of 
disinformation. This claim by Berlusconi gained traction in the media, and possibly 
among the general public. If Berlusconi’s voters believe that he is indeed unfairly 
                                                 
28 If such a survey did exist, it would likely be unusable due to social desirability bias. A respondent would 
be unlikely to admit both that she believes Berlusconi to be corrupt, and that she has voted or will vote 




victimized by the judiciary then they will obviously not be very trusting of the judiciary. I 
test whether trusting the judiciary has an effect on support for Berlusconi.   
From impressions of the south of Italy (or the mezzogiorno) that are common (Lumley 
and Morris 1997), one might expect that those who continue to support an ostensibly 
corrupt politician are from the south of Italy, which is reputedly low on social capital due 
to its history of hierarchical organizations (Putnam 1994). However, a cursory look at 
Italy’s electoral map since 1994 reveals that Berlusconi’s base of support has largely 
been in the north of the country, plus Sicily (Shin and Agnew 2008). The mezzogiorno 
has not been an area that Berlusconi has depended on for his power.  
Therefore, this paper does two things. The first is that it tests whether social norms that 
are accepting of corruption (and are created by perceptions of corruption as common) 
increase the likelihood of a respondent voting for Berlusconi. I also test the effect of 
perceiving high levels of political corruption on the likelihood of a respondent voting for 
Berlusconi. This extends the literature on when people will engage in corruption and 
illegal activity, bringing it to the realm of voting and governance. 
The second is that it tests whether there is any evidence for the information theory – the 
claim that the reason that voters do not punish corrupt politicians is because they do not 
have sufficient information.   
The format of the paper is as follows:  In the next section I outline the literature and 
explain the theory behind the hypotheses. This is followed by a brief explanation of the 




to understand both the man and political situation in Italy since the 1990s. I then test the 
hypotheses using the available data, and conclude. 
Literature and Hypotheses 
Despite allegations of bribery, false accounting, false testimony, tax evasion, 
embezzlement, mafia connections and money laundering, Silvio Berlusconi has lead a 
long and successful career as an Italian politician, serving three terms as prime minister 
of Italy. The party which he created – or rather, the coalition headed by this party – won a 
parliamentary majority in 1994, 2001 and 2008, and was the second largest coalition in 
1996, 2006 and 2013. Altogether, he is Italy’s longest serving post-war prime minister.  
Berlusconi is perhaps one of the clearest and most cited examples of a corrupt politician 
winning reelection.  From outside Italian politics, looking in, it appears one can safely 
assume that every Italian knows that Berlusconi is corrupt or that it is quite likely that he 
is involved in some corruption. Although Berlusconi had not been definitively convicted 
of anything until 2013, he was able to avoid conviction largely through legal 
technicalities such as the statute of limitations, the parliamentary immunities granted 
Italian legislators, and changes to what constitutes certain crimes, which his own 
parliamentary majority passed.29 
Berlusconi poses an interesting case for social scientists as he is repeatedly elected 
despite continual allegations and charges of corruption. This is important because it is 
                                                 
29 To say that Berlusconi had not been convicted until 2013 is somewhat misleading. In fact, he had been 
found guilty in court before this. However, the Italian legal system allows for two appeals: one on the 
merits of the case, and one on legal procedure. Defendants do not serve time while waiting for these 
appeals. So, if one is found guilty in a lower court, of say tax fraud, one does not go to jail until found 
guilty in both appeals. Since many appeals are not completed before the statute of limitations runs out, 




well documented that corruption has negative effects on economic growth, support for 
democratic institutions, the allocation of scarce resources, and social trust (Rose-
Ackerman 1999, Cho and Kirwin 2007, Lambsdorf 2005, Uslaner 2008, Clausen et al 
2011).  
Why voters do not punish corrupt politicians is a fundamental puzzle in the study of 
corruption (Kurer 2001, Golden 2006). While this paper is a case study of Italy – 
specifically Silvio Berlusconi’s time as a politician in Italy – instances of voters refusing 
to punish corrupt politicians can be found in both rich countries, such as in the ‘machine 
politics’ of the United States, as well as in developing countries. For example, political 
scientists working in settings as different as Japan, Italy and Mexico have struggled with 
why this is the case (Reed 1999, Golden and Chang 2001, Chong et al 2011). Perhaps 
best known is Golden and Chang’s (2001) work on Italy from the first post-World War II 
parliament to the 1990s, which showed a lack of punishment of corrupt politicians in all 
but one parliament studied.  
Punishing or rewarding incumbents at the ballot box is a cornerstone of liberal 
democratic politics, the main power given to the citizenry to effect political change. If 
citizens choose to return corrupt politicians to office, the chances of cycles of corruption 
being ended are slim, as politicians in states with weak institutions may hold a great deal 
of informal power outside their de jure power (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). A 
culture of corruption is difficult to change once it has taken hold (Dong et al 2012). 
Drawing on theories of social norms, I argue that once corruption is seen as common, or 




is, when a voter believes corruption to be common, he is more likely to consider corrupt 
actions acceptable, and to be tolerant of a corrupt politician. The foil to this position is the 
information theory. What I term the information theory is the position that holds that the 
only thing stopping voters from punishing corrupt politicians is a lack of information. I 
also test whether there is any evidence for the information theory – that voters would 
have punished Berlusconi electorally if only they had had better information and known 
he was corrupt.  
Theories of pro-social behavior and how the actions of others affect one’s attitudes and 
actions have shown that the behavior of others has an effect on whether one complies 
with the tax code (Frey and Torgler 2007), norms against littering (Frey, Torgler and 
Wilson 2009), or whether one engages in criminal behavior generally (Kahan 1998).  
Tavits (2010) shows that people are more likely to engage in corruption when they 
perceive corruption as widespread using a survey of the general public and of public 
officials in Estonia. A recent paper by Dong, Dulleck and Torgler (2012) also shows that 
people are more likely to consider corruption to be justifiable when they perceive 
corruption as being common and so are more willing to engage in such behavior.30 
However, we do not know how perceiving corruption affects voter behavior, or whether 
this acceptance of corrupt behavior extends to the realm of voting.  
I hypothesize that perceiving corruption as common in one’s peer group will make voters 
more tolerant of corrupt politicians. This is contrary to the claims of policy experts who 
argue for increased voter information as a panacea for corruption (Stapenhurst et al 
                                                 
30 These papers look at people’s perceptions of corruption amongst the population generally, not 





2006). This position assumes that increased information – allowing voters to perceive 
more corruption – will mean that voters will be less tolerant of corrupt behavior and 
punish politicians accordingly. If the social norms research already carried out extends to 
the realm of voting, then voters who perceive higher levels of corruption generally, will 
actually be less likely to punish corrupt politicians. As such, this would make an 
important contribution to our understanding of how voters determine whether to punish 
corrupt politicians. 
Perceiving corruption as common likely causes a voter to discount allegations of 
corruption against a politician. If corruption is perceived as being pervasive, one will 
likely assume that the replacement politician would also be corrupt. As Golden (2006, 
p9) writes “forcing a corrupt individual legislator out of national office […] has no 
immediate impact on national policy or on the overall degree of corruption tolerated by 
the governing parties” and so it is not clear to what extent a voter benefits by being 
represented by the only (or one of the few) clean players in a dirty game.  
That is, once corruption is seen as normal, it can seem sensible for voters to choose a 
corrupt politician who may be more likely to ‘get things done’: voters in Brazil have the 
saying ‘he steals, but he gets things done’.   
I also hypothesize that perceiving higher levels of political corruption will have the same 
effect: perceiving political corruption as common should increase the likelihood of 
supporting a corrupt politician.  
Fearon (1999) argues that elections should be seen not as a chance to punish incumbents, 




as endemic – voters are more likely to choose what might ordinarily be considered a ‘bad 
type’. A politician who is corrupt but who appears to be effective may well be preferred 
to a politician who is less corrupt, but also less effective. This is because the corruption 
part of the equation is severely discounted, to the point of not being considered at all: if 
everyone is corrupt then corruption does not figure into voter calculus. 
The policy implications of this are important. If the electorate comes to embrace 
corruption then we cannot assume that the electorate can be counted on as part of the 
solution to the problem of corruption, contrary to the hopes of the transparency 
movement.  
The push for greater transparency as a cure to political corruption came to the forefront of 
policy discussions in the nineties, when ‘good governance’ (often defined as simply the 
absence of corruption) became the latest panacea to the development woes of poorer 
countries. This has led to the development of organizations like Transparency 
International that focus on corruption and transparency, and transparency programs in 
development organizations such as the World Bank. However, although many attempts 
have been made to curb corruption over the last twenty years, it seems that corruption in 
both developed and developing countries has not decreased, and may well have increased 
(Bracking 2007). This is despite the millions of dollars spent by international 
organizations, donor governments, and NGOs on programs to increase transparency, 
strengthen civil society and the media, and create anti-corruption watchdogs (Stapenhurst 




The social norms theory which I lay out above and the information theory – which argues 
for transparency and more information about corruption as a solution to the problem of 
corruption – are essentially at odds. The social norms theory posits that when corruption 
is common, the more information we have about corruption the more corruption becomes 
normalized and acceptable. The information theory posits that when corruption is 
common, the more information we have about corruption the more we will act to bring 
about less corruption. 
I test the different positions laid out here – Social Norms Theory, and Information Theory 
– using several different sets of survey data on Italy since Silvio Berlusconi entered 
politics.  
Building on the work on social norms, showing that perceptions of corruption increase 
the likelihood of a person both claiming that corruption is acceptable and the likelihood 
of a person engaging in corruption, I test the following hypotheses.  
H1a: Respondents who claim that corruption is common are more likely to claim that 
corruption can be justified. 
H1b: Respondents who claim that corruption can be justified are more likely to support 
Silvio Berlusconi. 
H1c: Respondents who claim that political corruption is common are more likely to 
support Silvio Berlusconi. 
It is possible that people do not (or did not) believe that Berlusconi is corrupt; Berlusconi 




something that has been picked up by the international media (The Economist 2009).31 
His supporters may have little faith in the integrity of the justice system and so believe 
that Berlusconi is the victim of political enemies with an axe to grind, or of some sort of 
conspiracy. Alternatively, his supporters may be poorly informed due to Berlusconi’s 
control of the Italian media market – those who trust television as an institution are likely 
influenced by Berlusconi’s spin, or selective coverage of political events. This can 
broadly be termed the Information Theory: the only thing in the way of voters punishing 
corrupt politicians and pushing for good governance is the lack of good reliable 
information. This leads to three hypotheses. 
H2a: Respondents who trust the Italian legal system are less likely to support Berlusconi. 
H2b: Respondents who trust the institution of television are more likely to support 
Berlusconi. 
H2c: Respondents with lower levels of political knowledge are more likely to support 
Berlusconi.  
Economic Voting  
One variable that immediately comes to mind in predicting support for a political party, 
or its leader, is the state of the national economy. However, research has shown that 
while economic voting models can be helpful in understanding voter behavior in some 
countries (countries with high clarity of responsibility, where it is clear who is in power) 
this is not the case for other countries (countries with low clarity of responsibility). Italy 





is one of these low clarity of responsibility countries. Van der Brug et al (2007) found 
Italy to be a low clarity of responsibility country for every year studied (1989, 1994, 
1999). In their study the authors find that in low clarity countries the effects of the 
economy on elections are contrary to expectation. Following Powell and Whitten (1993) 
and Whitten and Palmer (1999), they conclude that “economic voting as traditionally 
formulated does not exist in low clarity countries” (173). It is worth noting that van der 
Brug et al do find that voters in low clarity countries are guided by prospective 
expectations, rather than retrospective punishment of incumbents. This makes sense for 
the Italian context for two reasons. The first is that Berlusconi consistently promises more 
than he delivers. It seems to be these promises that help him get elected, rather than his 
performance in office. The second is that Italy, more so than other low clarity countries, 
is regularly governed by technocratic governments where it is not clear who is in charge, 
or what party one would blame even if one wanted to vote retrospectively.  
Data 
I use three different datasets in this paper. The European Values Survey (EVS) began in 
1981 with surveys in the original European Member states, and has grown to include 47 
countries in the most recent wave.32 The EVS is mainly concerned with human values: 
the survey asks about family, work, religious, political and social values. While many of 
the questions change over time, a core group of questions has remained the same. The 
EVS also asks about voting behavior; respondents are asked for whom they would vote if 
an election were held tomorrow.  The four waves that have been carried out to date were 





carried out in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2009. In this paper, I use the data on Italy for 1999 
and 2009.  
The Eurobarometer (Eb) is a measure of public opinion in Europe.33 The Standard 
Eurobarometer was established in 1973 and consists of about 1000 respondents per 
country, with questions on family, health, environment, etc. The Standard Eb can also 
contain supplemental questions. The Flash Eb is an ad hoc survey carried out on a special 
topic. There are also surveys that are fielded only in Central and Eastern Europe, and in 
countries that are candidates for EU membership. In this paper I use data on Italy from 
Eb 69.2, which focuses on elections and also has questions on the judiciary and 
television. This survey was fielded in 2008.  
The Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems (CSES) focuses on electoral systems, but 
also contains questions on voting and demographics.34 The CSES also takes suggestions 
for questions from researchers, and so the second wave (2001-2006) contains a question 
on corruption. I use the data on Italy in this second wave; the Italy portion of the survey 
was fielded in May 2006, the month after the 2006 Italian national election.  
Because there are several datasets used in this paper, the models are not perfectly 
consistent throughout the paper. The first model, which extends the results of Dong et al 
(2013) replicates the model used in that paper. The rest of the models in this paper follow 
Anderson (2000) and control for age, gender, income, ideology and religiosity, as far as is 
possible.  Where possible, I have estimated each model with controls for region.  







 Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to prominence must be understood in the context of the Italian 
political crisis that occurred after the Clean Hands investigation – really a series of 
investigations – carried out by magistrates in Milan beginning in the 1990s. The 
corruption that was exposed was astounding, even to Italians, and meant the breakdown 
of the entrenched parties that had ruled Italy since the end of World War II. It is hard to 
overstate the effect of Clean Hands. In 1993 Gabriele Cagliari, the former president of 
the state owned energy group Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), and Raul Gardini, the 
managing director of Ferruzzi – a huge agrochemicals group – both committed suicide 
while under investigation. In 1994 Bettino Craxi, who had twice served as President of 
the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) fled to Tunisia after being found guilty of 
corruption. He was, by all accounts, the most despised man in Italy at that time.  
By this time, Silvio Berlusconi was already a successful entrepreneur, and incredibly 
wealthy. He was well known in Italy due to his ownership of Mediaset (a subsidiary of 
his Fininvest holding company) and the soccer club AC Milan.  
 The funding sources for his early projects have never been made clear. The two most 
likely possibilities for the origin of this money are that it was either money that 
Berlusconi had illegally transferred out of the country and then brought back in through 
Swiss holdings, or that it was money laundered by the Mafia (The Economist, ‘Silvio 
Berlusconi. An Italian Story.’).  
In the late seventies and early eighties Berlusconi created a television monopoly (aside 




stations. When the constitutional court ordered Berlusconi to stop broadcasting, his friend 
Craxi (who would later become PM) passed a law in the Council of Ministers ordering 
the resumption of broadcast. In 1990 a law was passed which allowed Mediaset to remain 
in its position as national broadcaster of three commercial stations (Ginsborg 2005, p37). 
 Aside from his television stations, in the seventies Berlusconi also bought the daily 
newspaper Il Giornale that (in 2005) had a circulation of 220,000 per day. He ostensibly 
sold the paper upon entering politics in 1994, but the sale was to his brother.   
Italy is widely perceived to have the most independent judiciary in Europe. In 1992 the 
magistrates of Milan began to flex their muscle. They took aim at corruption in public 
life, and politicians, civil servants and business leaders were investigated. Berlusconi’s 
friend and mentor Bettino Craxi, rather than continue to deny any wrongdoing, admitted 
to the initial charges, claiming that this was standard procedure, and that everyone – most 
importantly, every political party – was involved.   
As the 1994 elections approached, the political establishment was in turmoil. At the end 
of 1993 the Forza Italia party (‘Forward Italy’, the chant of the Italian soccer team) was 
created. It was essentially created by the Fininvest firm and was filled with familiar faces 
from Berlusconi’s companies. When national elections were announced in January 1994 
Berlusconi allied with the Lega Nord (‘Northern League’) and the Alleanza Nazionale 
(‘National Alliance’) to make a pre-election center-right coalition. These were very 
different right wing parties. The Northern League (NL) was a sometimes separatist party 
based in the northern industrialized provinces. These are provinces that are generally 




south to the poorer regions. The National Alliance (NA) was a nationalist party with 
somewhat fascist tendencies. Although these parties were strange bedfellows, the 
coalition won a majority in the lower house, and a near majority in the Senate. Forza 
Italia was strongly supported in northern regions that are generally associated with 
prosperity and efficiency, as well as high social capital (Putnam 1994). The party was 
also strong in the South, in provinces like Campania and Sicilia that are traditionally 
associated with corruption and underdevelopment. Berlusconi became prime minister of 
Italy for the first time in 1994.  
In November 1994 Berlusconi received notice that he was under investigation for 
corruption. Berlusconi and his media accused the magistrates of an ‘institutional coup 
d’état’. Nonetheless, Umberto Bossi, leader of the Northern League, pulled his support 
from the government, and Berlusconi’s first government fell; a technocratic government 
headed by Lamberto Dini was formed.   
The accusations by the magistrates were of tax evasion and bribery of the Financial 
Police. The magistrates finished their inquiry and recommended prosecution. Three years 
later, Berlusconi was found guilty and sentenced to almost three years in prison. 
However, as the case was appealed he did not yet have to serve time.  In May 2000 the 
Appeals Court confirmed Berlusconi’s guilt, but as the statute of limitations had expired 
he could not be sent to prison. A year later the highest court, Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione, declared there was insufficient evidence to find Berlusconi guilty. However, 




Unsurprisingly, beginning in 1994 – when Berlusconi stood accused of illegally financing 
political parties, bribing the Financial Police, tax fraud, the corruption of judges in Italy, 
and tax fraud and breach of anti-trust laws in Spain – those on Berlusconi’s Mediaset 
channels began to attack the activist magistrates as criminals and anti-democratic 
communists.  
National elections were not held until 1996, when Romano Prodi’s center-left Olive Tree 
coalition won back power. The coalition held until the elections of 2001, when 
Berlusconi was once again well placed. He had brought the NL back into the fold, and 
had a simple program of lower taxes, infrastructure spending for the South, less 
bureaucracy in the government, zero tolerance on illegal immigration and more security 
in the cities. Perhaps more importantly, Berlusconi wrote and freely distributed to fifteen 
million homes a book about his life (this number is according to Ginsborg (2005); Stille 
(2006) claims it was only twelve million). Written in simple prose, this book tells of the 
obstacles Berlusconi overcame to rise to power and success.35 The book was entitled An 
Italian Story (Una storia italiana). Berlusconi also presented and signed a ‘Contract with 
Italians’, modeled on Newt Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’. He pledged not to stand 
for reelection unless at least four of his five promises were kept. 
Berlusconi also had a huge media presence on his Mediaset channels, and parity of 
presence with others on the state owned RAI. Berlusconi’s was the only face allowed on 
any Forza Italia materials. As a result, his face was everywhere, and a vote for Forza was 
a vote for Berlusconi. Berlusconi’s new coalition, the House of Liberties (La Casa della 
                                                 
35 Although the paper format was 127 pages long, the pdf version available online is less than 40 pages 




Libertà) won majorities in the lower house and the Senate, and Berlusconi once again 
became prime minister. 
Berlusconi’s government passed a law requiring evidence admitted to court from outside 
Italy had to be original documents (complicating a case again him); Italy tried to block 
the introduction of a European warrant for arrest for crimes such as corruption; the 
Justice Minister tried to transfer one of the judges sitting on a case involving alleged 
corruption by Berlusconi and Craxi in the eighties. This would have caused the trial to 
restart, and so the statute of limitations would have meant that Berlusconi would have 
been beyond prosecution in this case. Another law was passed that meant that if a 
defendant was unable to get a fair trial in a particular area, the trial could be moved. 
Berlusconi’s lawyers requested another trial in which he was involved be moved from 
Milan.  Berlusconi did not get his way in either of these cases. In April, one of 
Berlusconi’s associates and co-defendants was sentenced to eleven years in prison. Less 
than two years later, the government passed a law granting immunity for those holding 
the highest office in government for their time in office. This was weeks before a case in 
which Berlusconi was a defendant was set to finish up (the case which his justice minister 
had tried to have moved from Milan). Because of the statute of limitations in Italy, and 
the length of time that trials take (even if found guilty, a defendant does not have to face 
punishment until both appeals are heard) the immunity law seriously decreased the 
chances of those granted immunity being prosecuted with crimes they have ever 
committed. This immunity law would be found unconstitutional in 2004. 
By 2005 Romano Prodi’s center-left alliance appeared well positioned to take power in 




designed to disadvantage the center-left (the center-left coalition contained several small 
parties that would likely not reach the 4% of national vote threshold to enter parliament).  
The election results were initially too close to call. Prodi’s majority in the lower house 
was decided in court. Although the difference in votes between the two coalitions was 
less than 25,000, Berlusconi’s new electoral law meant that there was a bonus for the 
majority in the lower house, meaning that Prodi’s coalition was guaranteed a majority. 
Prodi’s majority in the Senate was also confirmed in court. However this majority was 
tenuous and consisted of only two seats (Shin and Agnew 2008, p 112).  
In June 2006 inquiries began into possible Mafia investment in Fininvest in the 1970s. In 
May 2007 another trial began against Berlusconi – this time for corrupting the course of 
justice. However, this trial would time out as there remained only eleven months in which 
to finish the trial (and both appeals).  
Berlusconi registered a new party name in August, the People of Freedom. The People of 
Freedom party would absorb both Forza Italia and the National Alliance Party. The 
center-left had already merged to create the Democratic Party.  
Prodi lost a confidence vote the following January and resigned. After failing to assign a 
technocratic government – the right refused to support it – the president announced 
elections for that April. Polls showed Berlusconi ahead, and indeed his coalition won a 
large majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The People of Freedom party 
once more allied with the Northern League, and with a Sicilian party that sought more 




Berlusconi once again seemed to set about protecting his own interests. The government 
approved a bill to ban eavesdropping in cases involving market abuse and insider trading, 
and to limit media coverage of criminal trials. Berlusconi also tried to avoid a European 
Court order regarding his Rete 4 channel. In the name of law and order three thousand 
soldiers were deployed on the streets of Italy. A new immunity law protecting Berlusconi 
was passed.  
In February 2009 Berlusconi’s former advisor was sentenced to four and half years in 
prison for bribery. Berlusconi was also implicated in this case. Berlusconi’s wife filed for 
divorce as she no longer wanted to be married to a man who “consorts with minors” (The 
Economist, ‘Scuttlebutt’). This was followed by the announcement of an investigation in 
to a prostitution ring, in which some of the alleged prostitutes were women who had 
stayed at Berlusconi’s house.  
Soon afterwards, Berlusconi began proceedings to sue several media outlets over their 
coverage of him. On August 28th La Republica announced that Berlusconi was suing 
them for one million euro for asking ten questions about his personal life. L’Unita was 
sued for two million euro, and five of its journalists for two hundred thousand each. The 
Berlusconi-family controlled Il Giornale published a story about charges against a 
Catholic bishop who was the editor of a Catholic paper critical of the recent scandals 
involving the Prime Minister.   
In October the constitutional court once again deemed as unconstitutional a law granting 
law makers immunity. That same month Berlusconi’s Fininvest was ordered to pay €750 




was responsible for the bribe. A few days later Berlusconi announced that he would push 
for constitutional reform of the judiciary.  
That December a call girl, Patrizia D’Addario, published a book about an encounter with 
Berlusconi, claiming he paid her for sex; Gaspare Spatuzza, a witness in a mafia trial, 
told prosecutors that Berlusconi made a deal with Cosa Nostra in 1994, upon entering 
politics.  
In January 2010 two trials against Berlusconi resumed, following his loss of immunity. 
Berlusconi’s lawyer David Mills had his case quashed due to the statute of limitations, a 
win for Berlusconi as he was also implicated in this case.  
In October 2010 Berlusconi was hit by what is perhaps his most well-known scandal: 
Ruby Rubacuori (aka Ruby Heartstealer; aka Karima ElMahroug) appeared in an 
interview in which she claimed that Berlusconi gave her €7,000 cash as well as jewelry 
and gave the world the term ‘bunga bunga party’. More seriously, it also emerged at this 
time that three men were being investigated for allegedly procuring prostitutes for 
Berlusconi, and that Berlusconi’s office had contacted a police station in which Ms. 
Heartstealer was being detained on a minor offence claiming that she should be released 
to avoid an international incident (the police were told she was the granddaughter of 
President Mubarak of Egypt). As she was seventeen at the time, Ruby should have been 
sent to the Italian equivalent of Child Protective Services.  
The calendar year was rounded out by a motion for a vote of no confidence in the 
parliament. Berlusconi survived, in both chambers, prompting rioting on the streets of 




accused Berlusconi of buying off members of the opposition after two of DiPietro’s own 
party members voted with Berlusconi, as did thirty members of Fini’s parliamentary 
group).  
However, 2011 began with another setback for Berlusconi: a law allowing ministers to 
have cases against them put on hold was scrapped by the Constitutional Court, and 
prosecutors in Milan began to investigate the prime minister for paying an underage 
prostitute (Ruby Heartstealer), and more seriously, abuse of power (for contacting the 
police and having Ruby released from jail). Berlusconi was indicted that February and 
ordered to stand trial.  
In June, voters rejected four referenda, one of which was to allow ministers to avoid court 
appearance by citing government business (Berlusconi had previously delayed his own 
trials with this tactic). However, Berlusconi once again won a vote of confidence in both 
houses of parliament.  
The sex scandals continued into September when prosecutors released claims that 
Berlusconi put a government plane at the disposal of Gianpaolo Tarantini, a man who had 
got over 100 women to go to Berlusconi’s parties and who was accused of pimping by 
prosecutors (while prostitution is legal in Italy for women over 18, pimping is not). By 
this time the Italian economy was in bad shape – Berlusconi finally stopped denying that 
this was the case – and the government was receiving help from the European Central 
Bank, with conditionality.  
 In Novermber, Italy was placed under IMF monitoring, and on November 12 Berlusconi 




The following October, Silvio Berlusconi announced that he would not run for office 
again. Later that month he was convicted for the fourth time, this time for tax fraud. He 
was sentenced to four years in prison, but appealed the case.   
In December Mario Monti, the head of the technocratic government, lost the support of 
the People of Liberty party and announces he would resign (although he remained as 
prime minister until after the elections the following April). This was before he was able 
to pass electoral reforms – widely regarded as necessary for political stability in Italy. 
Soon afterwards Berlusconi had a change of heart and announced he would run in the 
next election after all. The election was a win for several protest parties with no one party 
having a clear majority in parliament.  Letta formed a coalition dependent on 
Berlusconi’s People of Freedom. 
In June Berlusconi was found guilty of paying an underage prostitute (Ruby Rubacouri). 
In August the Supreme Court upheld the sentence against him for tax fraud. As he was in 
his seventies at this stage actual prison time was always unlikely. However, he was 
banned from holding public office because of an anti-corruption law passed by the Monti 
government, although he was at that time a member of the Senate. 
Despite the tenuous position of the government, the Senate did vote to expel Berlusconi 
on November 27th 2013. He remained the leader of his party however. This is not 
unprecedented. In fact, Beppe Grillo, the leader of the Five Star Movement, is not a 
member of parliament: he is unable to run for parliament due to having a criminal record. 





In January 2014, Renzi and Berlusconi – neither of whom hold national office – met and 
agreed on new electoral and constitutional changes. A month later, Letta lost his position 
as prime minister after the PD decided he should no longer remain. Renzi then became 
the next prime minister, with Berlusconi waiting in the shadows. Berlusconi’s ban on 
public office was upheld by the courts in March 2014, and there is no clear successor to 
take over the reins of Forza Italia. Of course, if history is any indication Berlusconi will 
not loosen his grip on those reins any time soon.  
Results 
 
Why do voters support corrupt politicians? Taking Silvio Berlusconi as an example of a 
politician who continually succeeded in attaining public office despite corruption 
accusations, corruption charges, and corruption convictions, I explore several hypotheses. 
I begin by testing the implications of the social norms theory. Dong et al (2012) show 
that perceiving others as carrying out acts of corruption increased the likelihood of one 
citing corruption as justifiable. I extend this theory by testing whether this justification of 
corruption means that one is more likely to vote for a corrupt politician.  
First I retest the claim made by Dong et al (2012) that perceiving higher levels of 
corruption means that one is more likely to claim that corruption is acceptable.  
H1a: Respondents who claim that corruption is common are more likely to claim that 




Next I test the effect of claiming that corruption can be justified on the likelihood of 
supporting Berlusconi.  
H1b: Respondents who claim that corruption can be justified are more likely to support 
Silvio Berlusconi. 
I also test the effect of perceiving high levels of political corruption. This should have the 
same effect as perceiving corruption in one’s peer group, causing voters to discount 
corruption charges as unimportant. 
H1c: Respondents who perceive high levels of political corruption are more likely to 
support Silvio Berlusconi.  
Berlusconi often claims that his legal problems stem from an activist liberal judiciary that 
is out to get him. I take this to be disinformation. However, the implication is clear: the 
legal system is not trustworthy, but partisan and vindictive.  
H2a: Respondents who trust the Italian legal system are less likely to support Berlusconi. 
Berlusconi’s media empire Mediaset controls the three largest private television stations 
in Italy as well as a newspaper, and publishing house. While prime minister, Berlusconi 
also had some power over the state broadcaster. Commentators have claimed that 
Berlusconi’s television stations provide a positively skewed image of Berlusconi and his 
party. Therefore, we can expect voters who mainly get their information from television, 




H2b: Respondents who trust the institution of television are more likely to support 
Berlusconi. 
I also add one related hypothesis to the Information Theory hypotheses: that those who 
are better politically informed are less likely to support Berlusconi. 
H2c: Respondents who are more politically informed are less likely to vote for 
Berlusconi. 
Does having a higher acceptance of corruption increase the probability of 
voting for Berlusconi? (EVS) 
Using the European Values Survey (EVS), I test whether respondents who perceive high 
levels of corruption are more or less likely to find corruption acceptable, and therefore to 
vote for Berlusconi. I begin by estimating a model similar to the one used by Dong et al 
(2012) to test whether an increase in a respondent’s perception of corruption results an 
increase in the likelihood of claiming that corruption can be justified. This dataset is the 
file for Italy for all years that the survey was carried out (1981, 1990, 1999, 2009). 
However, the question on whether others accept bribes was only asked in 1999.  
In the model in Table 1, I use the control variables specified in Dong et al (2012). These 
are standard in the sociology literature on corruption and include variables that may 
reasonably effect whether one considers bribe paying to be justifiable. The controls 
included are gender,36 age, marital status,37 interest in politics,38 religion,39 risk 
                                                 
36 Male=1; female=2. 
37 Coded as 1 if married or widowed; coded as 0 otherwise. 
38 How important is politics in your life? very (4), (rather 3), not very (2), not at all (1). 
39 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days?  
More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often,  




aversion,40 income,41 whether the respondent lives in an urban area,42 employment,43 and 
education.44  
The main dependent variable in this model is a binary variable measuring whether the 
respondent believes that accepting bribes is justifiable.45  As most respondents answer 
‘never justified’, anything other than this is scored as 1 for the dependent binary variable. 
The main predictor variable is based on a question on the frequency of bribe taking.46 
As was shown by Dong et al, perceiving others as accepting bribes does have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of claiming that accepting bribes is 
justifiable: respondents who perceive corruption are more likely to say that corruption is 
justifiable. The result is statistically significant at 99% confidence, and the control 
variables perform similarly to Dong et al (2012).47 Going from the lowest perception of 
corruption to the highest means that a respondent goes from a 13% probability of 
claiming that bribery can be justified to a 26% probability, holding all other variables at 
their means. Older respondents were less likely to claim that accepting bribes was 
                                                 
40 Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which  
ones you personally think are important in a job? (15 items). Risk aversion: Good job security 
(1=mentioned). 
41 The income variable used is x047d. This variable is reconstructed to capture the income in purchasing 
power of respondents in 1999 (when Italy used the Italian lira) and 2009 (when Italy used the euro).  
42 Size of town: 1. Under 2,000; 2. 2,000 - 5,000; 3. 5 - 10,000; 4. 10 - 20,000; 5. 20 - 50,000; 6. 50 - 
100,000; 7. 100 - 500,000; 8. 500,000 and more. 
43 Because this is a categorical variable with several categories, including ‘self-employed’ and ‘student’ (ie, 
not a binary variable for employed/unemployed), I also estimated a model using the i.employment 
variable and found that none of the categories was statistically significant.  
44 At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time education, either at school or at an 
institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships.  
45 Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be  
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (…) someone accepting a bribe in the course of their 
duties (1=always justified, 10= never justified).  
46 “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties?” (4=almost all, 1=almost none) This is scored as 0 if the respondent responded 
‘almost none, and 3 she responded ‘almost all’. 




justifiable, all else equal. The same is true of people who were married, and those who 
are more educated. Those in higher income brackets were more likely to claim that 
accepting bribes can be justified, all else equal. Overall, we find strong evidence in 
support of H1a: perceiving corruption as common increases the likelihood of claiming 
that corruption can be justified. 
Table 1.  
 Justify Accept Bribes 
  



























Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1. The probability that a respondent claims that accepting bribes is justifiable. 
This begs the question of whether this acceptance of corruption translates into voting for 




not included in EVS for both years, the question on whether corruption can be justified is 
included for both years.48  Claiming that corruption can be justified increases the 
likelihood of voting for Silvio Berlusconi’s party (Table 2).49 This result is statistically 
significant at 99% confidence.  
 
Table 2. 
 Both Years 1999 2009 
    
Bribery as Justifiable 0.104*** 0.117*** 0.132** 
 (0.033) (0.0444) (0.0622) 
Gender -0.0798 -0.157 0.016 
 (0.0925) (0.127) (0.00535) 
Age 0.00304 0.000632 0.00675 
 (0.00300) (0.00426) (0.00535) 
Religiosity 0.0390* 0.0931*** -0.0204 
 (0.0222) (0.0314) (0.0410) 
Education 0.0323* -0.0112 0.0656* 
 (0.0164) (0.0229) (0.0308) 
Income -0.0539 0.0974 -0.141* 
 (0.0395) (0.0601) (0.077) 
Ideology 0.308*** 0.216*** 0.495*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0293) (0.0419) 
Constant -3.303*** -2.620*** -4.274*** 
 (0.298) (0.529) (0.730) 
    
Observations 1,355 792 520 
LogLik -516.77 -283.6 -168.97 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Tests for the Bribery as Justifiable variable are one-tailed.) 
Models show the likelihood of a respondent voting for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party.  
Regional control variables are included for 1999 and 2009 but are not shown. See Appendix. 
 
                                                 
48 For the voting model I revert to the ten point scale for whether the respondent believes bribery to be 
justifiable. In this and all subsequent models I control for religiosity48 and ideology,48 as well as age, 
gender, education, income and region, following Anderson (2000).A voting model using perceptions of 
corruption instead of a measure of bribery as justifiable as the main predictor variable is also included in 
the appendix. 
49 That is, Forza Italia in 1999 and Il Popolo della Libertà (‘People of Freedom’) in 2009. For this model I 




When we disaggregate by year, the effect is substantively strong in both years, and the 
effect is significant at 99% confidence for both years.50 We can see that the effect of the 
control variables remains broadly the same. 
Looking at the results for 1999, a respondent who scores lowest on the measure of 
whether bribery can be justified has a 10% probability of supporting Silvio Berlusconi, 
holding all other variables at their means. For a respondent who scores in the middle of 
the scale (5) the probability is 20%, and for a respondent who scores highest on this 
measure the probability is 40%. Thus, going from the lowest to the highest level on the 
measure of whether bribery can be justified quadruples the probability of a respondent 
voting for Berlusconi in 1999.   
Looking at the model for 2009, a respondent who scores lowest on the measure of 
whether bribery can be justified has a 13% probability of voting for Berlusconi, holding 
all other variables at their means. For a respondent who scores in the middle of the scale 
(5) the probability is 27%, and for a respondent who scores highest on this measure the 
probability is 52%. Thus going from the lowest to the highest value on this variable 
quadruples the likelihood of a respondent voting for Berlusconi in 2009, as it did in 1999.  
It is interesting to see what was happening in Italian politics in the years that the survey 
was fielded. In 1999 Romano Prodi’s center-left coalition was in power. Berlusconi had 
been investigated for crimes including bribing judges and the Financial Police, and tax 
fraud, but it was the center-left government that was responsible for raising taxes, and at 
                                                 
50 As the region is coded differently for the different year, I control for region in the 1999 model and the 




least threatening to make some of the needed structural reforms to Italy’s economy. Two 
years later Berlusconi would go on to win a large majority in both houses of parliament.  
The 2009 interviews were conducted between November and December. In 2009 
Berlusconi’s former advisor was sentenced to prison for bribery; Berlusconi attended the 
birthday party of an 18 year old model (with rumors of an affair between the two of 
them); his wife filed for divorce; Berlusconi was investigated as part of a prostitution 
ring; pictures of a party at his house were published containing images of naked women 
and a naked former PM of the Czech Republic; Berlusconi sued several publications and 
butted heads with the Catholic Church when Il Giornale published accusations against a 
Bishop who was mildly critical of Berlusconi’s behavior; the Constitutional Court 
deemed an immunity law unconstitutional, and Fininvest was ordered to pay over $1 
billion in reparations over bribes it paid (bribes for which a judge pronounced Berlusconi 
responsible). The year was rounded out by Italians taking to the streets of Rome for ‘No 
Berlusconi Day’; a call girl, Patrizia D’Addario, publishing a book about an encounter 
with Berlusconi, claiming he paid her for sex; and Gaspare Spatuzza, a witness in a mafia 
trial, telling prosecutors that Berlusconi made a deal with Cosa Nostra in 1994, upon 
entering politics.    
Thus, there was likely a social desirability bias at play here. That is, it is possible that 
considering the raft of allegations against Berlusconi at this stage – although only some 
of them are actually to do with corruption – many people who would in reality vote for 
him chose not to answer this question (from 1999 to 2009 the percentage of respondents 
who answered this particular question went from 70% to 52%), or chose to answer 




voted for him at this stage.51 Considering this, it is quite impressive that the model 
nonetheless reports similar results for 2009 and 1999, and that the results are so strong in 
both years. Despite the noise that is likely introduced because of social desirability the 
model still reports a strong substantive effect at 99% confidence.  
This finding extends the literature on corruption and social norms and provides evidence 
that social norms related to corruption do affect how voters choose their political 
representatives. Following on from work that shows that people who perceive corruption 
as common are more likely to engage in corruption themselves, we can see here that 
those who feel that corruption can be justified are more likely to vote for a corrupt 
politician (in this case, Silvio Berlusconi). Or, stated more generously, those who think 
that bribery can be justified are more forgiving of a politician who has been accused of 
corruption. Thus we have evidence of another mechanism that promotes a culture of 
corruption: those who perceive corruption to be common and so are more likely to say 
that corruption can be justified, are in turn more likely to vote for a corrupt politician. 
Thus, we find strong evidence in support of H1b: Respondents who claim that corruption 
can be justified are more likely to vote for Silvio Berlusconi. 
 
Does perceiving politicians as corrupt affect support for Silvio Berlusconi? 
(CSES) 
The second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) contains a 
question on how widespread corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in 
                                                 
51 The question in the EVS survey does not ask who the respondent voted for in the last election, but who 




Italy.52 The respondent can choose an answer from 1 (very widespread) to 4 (it hardly 
happens at all). I combined options 3 and 4 (as almost no respondents answered that bribe 
taking hardly happens at all) and reordered the variable so that on a scale of 1 to 3, 1 is 
the lowest frequency of corruption and 3 is the highest. The survey also asks respondents 
whom they voted for in the most recent election, and the previous election. Based on 
these responses, I created two binary variables, which capture whether the respondent 
said they voted for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 2001 and 2006 respectively.53  
It is important to note that this is different from the measurement of corruption above. 
This is specifically about political corruption, whereas the previous measure of corruption 
was of one’s compatriots, and can thus be seen as a measure of corruption in one’s peer 
group. 
All interviews for this wave of CSES in Italy were carried out on the 10th of May 2006. 
Berlusconi lost this election by a hair. Prodi’s majority in each chamber was decided in 
court and his majority in the Senate was only two seats.  
Following Anderson (2000) I once again control for religiosity54 and ideology,55 as well 
as age, gender, education, income and region. As the dataset contains a variable for which 
party the respondent voted for in 2001 I include this as a control variable in the 2006 
model.56    
                                                 
52 Q23. How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: 
very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it hardly happens at all? 
53 Forza Italia did not become Il Popolo de Libertà until August 2007.  
54 From question B2024, where 1 is ‘no religious beliefs’ and 4 is ‘strongly religious’. 
55 This is where the respondent self identifies on a scale of left (1) to right (10),  
56 I estimate the same model without controlling for who the respondent voted for in 2001. The 




The results (Table 3) show that the effect of perceptions of political corruption on support 
for Berlusconi is not constant over time. In 2001 increased perceptions of political 
corruption meant that the voter was more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, 
while in 2006 increased perceptions of political corruption meant the opposite.  The 
results for 2001 are statistically significant and in the expected direction (one-tailed p-
value of 0.03). A respondent who perceives the lowest level of political corruption has a 
20% probability of voting for Forza Italia, holding all other variables at their means. A 
respondent who perceives the highest level of corruption has a 31% probability of voting 
for Forza Italia. Thererfore, going from the lowest to the highest perceptions of political 
corruption means that a voter is 11 percentage points more likely to support Berlusconi’s 
party.  
In the 2006 model, the effect is the opposite. Having a higher perception of corruption 
actually had a negative effect on the likelihood of voting for Forza Italia. Having the 
lowest perception of political corruption meant that one had a 21% probability of 
supporting Forza Italia, holding all other variables at their means. Having the highest 
perception of political corruption meant that one had a 5% probability of supporting 













   
Forza 2001  2.215*** 
  (0.324) 
Perceptions of Corruption 0.177** -0.428** 
 (0.139) (0.222) 
Age 0.00236 -0.00463 
 (0.00619) (0.00944) 
Gender 0.0826 0.0259 
 (0.179) (0.292) 
Income 0.148** -0.0647 
 (0.0735) (0.105) 
Education -0.116* 0.142 
 (0.0706) (0.114) 
Religiosity 0.254** 0.00233 
 (0.125) (0.190) 
Ideology 0.170*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0637) 
Constant -3.305*** -2.447* 
 (0.778) (1.297) 
Observations 298 215 
LogLik -150.6 -61.63 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Tests are one-tailed for Perceptions of Corruption variable.) 
The effect of perceptions of political corruption on the likelihood of voting for Forza Italia in 2001 and 
2006. Regional control variables are included in the model, but not shown. See Appendix. 
 
At first, this result seems puzzling. However, it lines up with the results of Ferraz and 
Finan’s (2008) study of Brazil’s randomly assigned municipal audits. These audits 
detailed the federal funds allocated to selected municipalities and any irregularities that 
auditors found after thorough investigation. Ferraz and Finan initially find no effect of the 
audits. However, when they control for the level of corruption reported they do find that 
very high levels of corruption result in a loss of vote share for the incumbent mayor. The 
authors find that an audit reporting one violation has no effect on incumbent reelection 




and three violations results in a fourteen percentage point drop in reelection rate. The 
reelection rate actually increased for incumbents in those municipalities where no 
violations were reported. Thus, it seems that voters reward politicians who are less 
corrupt than previously believed, and punish politicians who are much more corrupt than 
they believed. For politicians who are about as corrupt as expected, the new information 
had no effect. 
From the biography section of this paper we can see that as Berlusconi’s career 
progressed, the list of corruption charges, and the evidence that he was guilty of these 
charges, continued to grow. During Berlusconi’s 2001 – 2005 administration his 
government passed a law limiting how evidence from abroad could be admitted to court 
(which would benefit Berlusconi particularly in one of this trials); tried to block the 
introduction of a new EU warrant for crimes such as corruption; tried to transfer a judge 
from one of Berlusconi’s trials (which would have caused the stature of limitations to 
kick in); passed a law that trials could be moved (which Berlusconi tried to use to move 
another of his trials); passed an immunity law for the prime minister (that would be found 
unconstitutional in 2004). Thus is may have appeared that Berlusconi was now not 
simply another corrupt politician whose corruption could be discounted, but was above 
the average level of corruption.  
This finding is also important as it indicates that perceptions of corruption in one’s peer 
group have a different effect than perceptions of corruption in the political realm. It is 
possible that these mechanisms work against each other, or at least that they sometimes 
do. For what we can tell here, perceiving corruption as common in one’s peer group, or 




corrupt politician. However, the effect of perceiving political corruption may not be as 
simple. Evidence provided here seems to match up with the argument presented by Ferraz 
and Finan who claim that voters punish corrupt incumbents when they are much more 
corrupt than expected, but not when the level of corruption is about what they previously 
believed it to be.  
Overall, we find evidence in support of H3 for 2001 and evidence against H3 for 2006. It 
appears that in 2001 perceiving political corruption as common increased the likelihood 
of a respondent voting for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party. In 2006, perceiving political 
corruption as common had the opposite effect.  
Berlusconi and the Activist Judiciary (Eb) 
Berlusconi has long claimed that his political woes are caused by an activist liberal 
judiciary that is out to get him. Some researchers claim that this has helped his reelection 
prospects: if voters believe that the judiciary is biased and so out to persecute Berlusconi, 
the allegations against him will not diminish the likelihood of their voting for him.  
Eurobarometer 69.2 (which was carried out in 2008) asks respondents whether they trust 
the legal system in Italy.57 Respondents were also asked about their voting behavior in 
the previous national election. I have created a binary variable VotedForza, coded as 1 if 
the respondent said that she voted for Forza Italia in the previous election, and 0 if she 
voted for another party. The binary variable measuring trust in the judiciary is coded as 1 
if the respondent said that the Italian legal system is trustworthy, and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
57 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.  




Results show that going from claiming the legal system is not trustworthy to claiming 
that it is trustworthy actually increases the probability of the respondent saying she voted 
for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (Table 4). This is statistically significant at 90% confidence 
for a two-tailed test. 
Table 4. 
 Voted Forza Voted Forza 
Trust Justice 0.265  
 (0.192)  
Trust TV  0.452*** 
  (0.181) 
age -0.0113* -0.0116* 
 (0.00667) (0.00671) 
education 0.00680 0.0140 
 (0.0320) (0.0324) 
gender 0.445** 0.432** 
 (0.174) (0.175) 
ideology 0.343*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0409) 
Constant -2.841*** -2.828*** 
 (0.559) (0.555) 
   
Observations 409 400 
LogLik -149.5 -145.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tests for trust variables are one-tailed. 
Regional controls not shown. See Appendix. 
 
Nevertheless, we can reject H3a. A respondent who claims that the Italian legal system is 
trustworthy is not less likely to vote for Berlusconi. There is no statistically significant 
correlation between supporting Berlusconi and a lack of trust of the Italian legal system. 
Indeed, if anything, trusting the legal system actually increases the probability of voting 





Does Berlusconi’s control of the media mean  that respondents are more 
likely to support him? (Eb) 
Eurobarometer 69.2 also asks about trust in the institution of television.58 As was 
mentioned above, Berlusconi has a huge media presence in Italy. His Mediaset owns 
three of the six nationally broadcast cable stations, and he owns a publishing house, while 
his brother owns a national newspaper.  Many commentators have claimed that this 
control over Italian media is the reason why Berlusconi has been able to be so successful 
politically.  
I estimate a probit model that estimates the probability of a respondent voting for Forza 
Italia. I include a binary variable for trust in the institution of television as the main 
predictor variable (Table 4).  
Those who have trust in television as an institution are more likely to say that they voted 
for Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. The effect is statistically significant at 99% confidence for a 
one-tailed test. Looking at the marginal effects, trusting television increases the 
likelihood of supporting Berlusconi by 10 percentage points, from 10% to 20% holding 
all other variables at their means. This is more than moving one step to the right on the 10 
place ideology scale (which is a 7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting 
for Forza Italia, on average).  
This can actually be seen as evidence in favor of the information hypothesis: it is likely 
that those who trust television as an institution, and therefore are more likely to support 
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Berlusconi, do so because Berlusconi’s television stations portray a favorable image of 
him that plays down accusations against him.  
However, the mechanism is unclear: those who trust television are even more trusting of 
the legal system than those who don’t trust television (Table 5). This effect is statistically 
significant at 99.9% confidence, and substantively strong. Therefore it seems unlikely 
that these respondents trust Berlusconi over the judiciary that he claims is trying to 
persecute him. Of course, this does not preclude Berlusconi’s media from crafting and 
presenting a careful and positive image of Berlusconi and his party. 
When we look at the marginal effect of the variable for trusting television, holding the 
other variables at their means, going from not trusting the institution of television to 
trusting it means a 30 percentage point increase in the likelihood of the respondent saying 
she trusts the judicial system, going from 23% to 53%. Nevertheless, overall this 
evidence supports H3b: Respondents who trust the institution of television are indeed 
more likely to vote for Berlusconi. 
An obvious objection may be that those who trust television as an institution are likely to 
watch a lot of television and so have low political knowledge. In this survey at least, the 
data back up that objection. This version of Eurobarometer asks political knowledge 
questions to determine how much respondents know about the European Union. This 
questionnaire asked respondents about: the number of member states in the EU; whether 
Switzerland is a member; the EU presidency; the number of Euro Area members. I create 




questions she answered correctly.59 I estimate a probit model to test the effect of political 
knowledge on whether the respondent trusts the institution of television, once again 
controlling for age, education, gender, ideology, income and region. The results below 
show that in fact higher levels of political knowledge decrease the probability of the 
respondent saying she trusts television: those who are less well-informed are more likely 
to trust television (Table 5.). Respondents who answered all questions incorrectly have a 
48% probability of saying they trust television, while those who answered all questions 
correctly have a 29% probability of saying so. Considering that the results above show 
that trusting television results in a 6% increase in the probability of supporting 
Berlusconi, this is certainly evidence in favor of the information theory.  
One caveat is that these four political knowledge questions were all concerning 
supranational politics, not Italian politics per se. While the two may be closely linked 
(that is, knowledge of Italian politics and knowledge of EU politics), that is not 
something that can be investigated here.  
Nonetheless, I also estimate a model that tests the effect of political knowledge on the 
likelihood of supporting Berlusconi. The results below indicate that an increase in 
political knowledge is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of voting for 
Berlusconi’s party: those with higher political knowledge are less likely to support 
Berlusconi. Going from the lowest level of political knowledge to the highest results in a 
more than seven percentage point reduction in the likelihood of a respondent voting for 
Forza Italia: respondents with the lowest level of political knowledge have a 17% 
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probability of voting for Forza Italia, while those with the highest level of political 
knowledge have a 10% probability of doing so, holding all other variables at their means.  
However, the knowledge variable is not significant in this model.60  
Table 5. 
 Trust Justice Trust Television Voted Forza Italia 
Trust Television 0.792***   
 (0.125)   
Knowledge  -.1342 *** -.0865 
  (.0555) (.0820) 
Age 0.00285 -.0054 -.0101 
 (0.00480) (0.0043) (.0063) 
Education  0.0383 0.0029 .0242 
 (0.0236) (.0225) (.0317) 
Gender (male) -0.0863 -.0427 -.4303*** 
 (0.124) (.1172) (.1683) 
Ideology -0.0319 0.0256 .3352*** 
 (0.0241) (.0221) (.0387) 
Constant -0.365 .2629 -.20748*** 
 (0.362) (.3514) (.5169) 
    
Observations 520 536 435 
LogLik -293.4 -342.60 -159.18 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regional control variables not shown. See Appendix. 




What can we say about Berlusconi’s supporters? We can say that certain factors make a 
voter more likely to support Silvio Berlusconi. Claiming that accepting bribes can be 
justified has a statistically significant – and substantively large – positive effect on the 
likelihood of supporting Berlusconi both in 1999, and in 2009. And, perceiving 
                                                 
60 Although, estimating the model without the regional control variables results in the knowledge variable 




corruption as common has a strong effect on whether one finds accepting bribes to be 
justifiable. 
Perceiving higher levels of corruption amongst politicians increases the probability that a 
respondent voted for Berlusconi in 2001, but decreases the likelihood in 2006.  
We are therefore presented with a puzzle: why were those who perceive higher levels of 
political more likely to vote for Berlusconi in 2001, but not in 2006? 
One possibility relates to Ferraz and Finan’s (2008) study of Brazil’s randomly assigned 
municipal audits. The authors found that voters reward politicians who are less corrupt 
than previously believed, and punish politicians who are much more corrupt than they 
believed. For politicians who are about as corrupt as expected, the new information had 
no effect. 
From the biography section of this paper we can see that as Berlusconi’s career 
progressed, the list of corruption charges, and the evidence that he was guilty of these 
charges, continued to grow. It seems likely, in light of this, that Berlusconi passed the 
threshold of whatever many voters believed to be the average level of corruption. 
Therefore, while those who perceived higher levels of corruption in 2001 were more 
likely to support Berlusconi in 2001 as he seemed to be just about as corrupt as everyone 
else, by 2006 he seemed more corrupt than most other politicians.  
Unfortunately, because of the different datasets used, we cannot estimate a model that 
includes both a measure for perceptions of corruption in one’s peer group (which has a 




political corruption (which has a positive effect in 1999 but a negative effect in 2006). 
Nonetheless, the results indicate that perceiving corruption in one’s peer group and 
perceiving corruption in the political realm may have quite different effects.  
Surprisingly, respondents seem oblivious to the supposed feud between Berlusconi and 
the judiciary: respondents who claimed that they trust the judicial system were not less 
likely to support Berlusconi. In fact, it seems they were more likely to do so. As 
predicted, those who trust television as an institution were significantly more likely to 
support Berlusconi. However, these respondents were also significantly more likely to 
trust the judicial system. Trusting television is also associated with lower levels of 
political knowledge.  
We therefore have evidence in favor of the social norms theory, and the information 
theory. In addition, we see the information theory working over time. Perceiving higher 
levels of political corruption increased the likelihood of voting for Berlusconi in 2001 
when the full breadth of his corruption was unknown, but decreases the likelihood in 
2006 when more is known.  
This is a strong endorsement of the information theory: Although it seems that there is a 
segment of the population that is less likely to care about corruption (those with social 
norms accepting of corruption), exposing corruption may still cost corrupt politicians the 
support of a significant segment of the population.  
The implications for policies and organizations that wish to reduce political corruption 
are important. Social norms that accept bribery as justifiable have important 




corrupt politician. Perceptions of political corruption are important also: if voters believe 
political corruption to be common they may be less likely to punish a corrupt politician 
when his acts are made public (that is, unless the politician’s level of corruption is much 
worse than what the voter believes to be the norm). Thus, the refrain of ‘they’re all 
corrupt!’ likely does much more harm than good. The implications for media coverage 
that focuses continually on political corruption could be that voters become desensitized 
to this information and come to expect politicians to be corrupt, discounting corruption 
allegations and charges when deciding which candidate to support.  
Future research should take into account how voters perceive the level of corruption 
amongst politicians and the culture of corruption more generally in order to better 
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APPENDIX: Alternate Specifications of Models 
The effect of perceiving corruption as common on the likelihood of voting for Forza 
















































































Table 2. The effect of acceptance of bribery as justifiable on the likelihood of voting for 

































































Standard errors in parentheses 



















The effect of seeing bribery as justifiable on the likelihood of voting for Berlusconi in 
2009. Regional control variables included. 
VARIABLES 2009 
  












Ideology  0.495*** 
 (0.0419) 


























Centro (l) - Toscana -0.0536 
 (0.389) 
Centro (l) - Umbria 0.183 
 (0.460) 





Centro (l) - Lazio 0.154 
 (0.362) 
 Sud - Abruzzo 0.175 
 (0.562) 
Sud - Molise - 
  
Sud - Campania 0.695** 
 (0.339) 
Sud - Puglia 0.364 
 (0.355) 
 Sud - Basilicata 0.279 
 (0.573) 
Sud - Calabria 0.383 
 (0.381) 
 Isole - Sicilia 0.783** 
 (0.352) 







Standard errors in parentheses 














The effect of perceptions of political corruption on the likelihood of voting for 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, regional variables included. 






    
Forza 2001  2.215*** - 
  (0.324)  
Perceptions of Corruption 0.177* -0.428** -0.1566 
 (0.139) (0.222) (0.1598) 
Age 0.00236 -0.00463 0.0044 
 (0.00619) (0.00944) (0.0065) 
Gender 0.0826 0.0259 0.0419 
 (0.179) (0.292) (0.0839) 
Income 0.148** -0.0647 0.0419 
 (0.0735) (0.105) (0.079) 
Education -0.116* 0.142 0.0672 
 (0.0706) (0.114) (0.0790) 
Religiosity 0.254** 0.00233 0.1944 
 (0.125) (0.190) (0.1399) 
Ideology 0.170*** 0.180*** 0.2281 
 (0.0349) (0.0637) (0.0436) 
V. Aosta - - .6813 
   (0.999) 
Lombardia 0.450 -0.248 -.123 
 (0.399) (0.606) (0.424) 
Veneto - - - 
    
Friuli V.G. - - - 
    
Liguria 0.697 -0.193 -0.0783 
 (0.550) (0.852) (0.601) 
Emilia-Romagna 0.251 0.727 0.229 
 (0.439) (0.643) (0.438) 
Toscana 0.219 -0.116 -0.2717 
 (0.447) (0.694) (0.490) 
Umbria - - - 
    
Marche - - - 
    
Lazio 0.922* -0.444 0.0559 
 (0.493) (0.765) (0.521) 
Abruzzi 0.121 - - 
 (0.549)   




    
Campania 0.492 - -1.037* 
 (0.410)  (0.602) 
Puglia 1.084** 0.384 .3635 
 (0.449) (0.615) (0.4557) 
Basilicata 1.148** -0.545 -.1864 
 (0.476) (0.723) (0.532) 
Calabria 1.271* 0.369 0.161 
 (0.658) (1.015) (0.723) 
Sicilia 1.144*** -0.0875 0.366 
 (0.359) (0.562) (0.364) 
Sardegna -0.0680 - - 
 (0.765)   
Constant -3.305*** -2.447* -3.241*** 
 (0.778) (1.297) (0.884) 
Observations 298 215 288 
LogLik -150.6 -61.63 -116.53 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 

















The effect of trust in the institutions of television and the justice system on the likelihood 
of voting for Forza Italia, including regional control variables. 
 Justice Model TV Model 
   
Trust Justice 0.265  
 (0.192)  
Trust TV  0.452*** 
  (0.181) 
age -0.0113* -0.0116* 
 (0.00667) (0.00671) 
education 0.00680 0.0140 
 (0.0320) (0.0324) 
gender 0.445** 0.432** 
 (0.174) (0.175) 
ideology 0.343*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0409) 
Liguria -1.333** -1.481** 
 (0.667) (0.691) 
Lombardia 0.0142 -0.0786 
 (0.351) (0.341) 
Veneto -0.190 -0.167 




   
Emilia Romagna -0.170 -0.414 
 (0.444) (0.458) 
Toscana 0.281 0.166 
 (0.551) (0.546) 
Marche -0.0734 -0.164 
 (0.449) (0.433) 
Umbria - - 
   
Lazio 0.00888 -0.262 




 (0.580) (0.583) 
Campania -0.225 -0.247 
 (0.399) (0.389) 
Puglia/Basilicata 0.550 0.536 
 (0.454) (0.449) 
Calabria -1.285 -1.319* 




Sicilia 0.830** 0.801** 
 (0.369) (0.356) 
Sardegna 1.329*** 1.249*** 
 (0.444) (0.424) 
Constant -2.841*** -2.828*** 
 (0.559) (0.555) 
   
Observations 409 400 
LogLik -149.5 -145.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




















The effect of trust in the institution of television on trust in the justice system, regional 
controls included. 
 Trust Justice 
  




















































Standard errors in parentheses 























The effect of political knowledge on trust in the institution of television (left) and the 
effect of political knowledge on the likelihood of voting for Forza Italia (right). Regional 
controls shown. 
 Trust Television Voted Forza Italia 
Knowledge -.1342 *** -.0865 
 (.0555) (.0820) 
age -.0054 -.0101 
 (0.0043) (.0063) 
education 0.0029 .0242 
 (.0225) (.0317) 
Gender (male) -.0427 -.4303*** 
 (.1172) (.1683) 
Ideology 0.0256 .3352*** 
 (.0221) (.0387) 
Liguria .3535 -1.566*** 
 (.3206) (.6633) 
Lombardia -.2277 -.0864 
 (.2527) (.3293) 
Friuli, Venezia, Giulia -.6993** -.4129 
 (.3123) (.3842) 
Emilia Romagna - - 
    
Toscana -.3086 -.2425 
 (.2733) (.4033) 
Marche -.6116** .0883 
 (.3096) (.5286) 
Umbria -.2322 -.3046 
 (.3342) (.4372) 
Lazio -.2407 - 
 (.5193)  
Molise and Abruzzi -.0542 -.1229 
 (.2843) (.3999) 
Campania -.2351 -.0493 
 (.3658) .5563 
Puglia/Basilicata -.3221 -.3143 
 (.2540) (.3791) 
Calabria -.4260 .4061 
 (.2916) (.4281) 
Calabria -.7130** -1.325* 
 (.3403) (.7777) 
Sicilia -.5979** .6322* 
 (.2668) (.3431) 




 (.3259) (.4237) 
Constant .2629 -.20748*** 
 (.3514) (.5169) 
   
Observations 536 435 
LogLik -342.60 -159.18 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
















Abstract: This paper uses a unique survey experiment to measure changes in the support 
of voters for corrupt politicians. Results show that context matters, with voters’ 
sensitivity to corruption being shaped by the type of political post held by politicians and 
the overall corruption in the political system. Experimental results show that voters are 
more forgiving of acts of corruption among higher ranked politicians in executive 
politicians, when corruption is common. Voters are no more forgiving of legislators when 
corruption is common than when it is uncommon. This article provides an important link 










This project attempts to answer two questions that are difficult to answer using 
observational data. The first is whether voters are more tolerant of corrupt politicians 
when they operate in an environment of corruption. The second is whether voters take the 
political position held by the corrupt politician into account when evaluating corruption 
allegations: do voters treat corrupt executives differently than corrupt legislators?  
The first question cannot be answered sufficiently using observational data as those 
people whose politicians operate in an environment of corruption are generally not the 
same people as those whose politicians operate in an environment without corruption. 
Recent experimental work has shown that those in high corruption countries do in fact 
evaluate corrupt politicians differently than those in low corruption countries (Klasnja 
and Tucker 2013). However, that project uses separate pools of subjects – one that is 
from a high corruption country and one that is from a low corruption country – and so 
cannot definitively say that it is the subjects’ considerations of the politician’s 
environment which causes subjects to be more or less forgiving of acts of corruption by 
the individual politician. To determine whether voters take this into account we would 
need to randomly assign a pool of subjects to evaluate a politician in a high corruption 
environment or to evaluate a politician in a low corruption environment. This is what is 
done here.  
The second question is tough to answer using observational data because there is so much 
noise surrounding these issues. In effect, in order to measure the effect that political 




accused of the same offence when the person is both in an executive position and a 
legislative position, at the same time.61 Of course, this is impossible in reality, but can be 
tested using experimental methods. There are many infractions that can be counted under 
the umbrella of corruption, and there is reason to believe that voters respond differently 
to each of these (eg, Botero et al 2014). An experimental approach allows us to hold the 
type of corruption in question constant. While we have good data on some countries, such 
as Chang et al’s (2010) data on the Italian parliament, this does not allow us to see the 
effect of political position on voter evaluation of corrupt politicians. The design presented 
here allows us to get some insight on this issue.  
This paper presents results from a unique survey experiment. Participants in the survey 
experiment were presented with a fictitious newspaper article about a fictitious corrupt 
politician in College Park, MD. The politician was presented either as the mayor or as a 
member of the city council of the city of College Park. The level of corruption in the city 
government was varied, with some participants being told that corruption in the city 
government was common, and others being told that the city was ‘a model of good 
governance’.62 
Respondents were a convenience sample from the University of Maryland consisting of 
undergraduate and graduate students as well as university staff who chose to take part in 
the study. The fictional politicians used were presented as local city politicians for several 
reasons. The first is that while those who study and work at the university likely do not 
                                                 
61 By executive position I mean an elected executive position such as a mayor or governor. While 
parliamentary systems have executives (prime ministers) elected from within the legislative branch I do not 
deal with these in this project.  
62 While ‘good governance’ carries with it other connotations besides a lack of corruption, the term is 




follow city politics they are nonetheless invested in the city. Most undergraduates and 
graduate students live in or around the city. Although many staff may live farther away 
they have a longer time horizon as they are likely to be connected to the university and 
the city indefinitely. Therefore the sample presents a combination of ignorance of real 
city politics, and some connection to and investment in the city. This means that it is 
reasonable to assume that the design overcomes many of the problems of hypothetical 
vignettes that are often used in survey work. The respondents are not answering on a 
hypothetical case, but on what they believe to be a real case that has real world 
consequences.  
The second reason that the politicians were presented as local city politicians is that while 
it is possible to deceive subjects as to the identity and activities of local politicians it 
would be much more difficult, likely impossible, to deceive a sample of respondents 
regarding the identity and activities of politicians at higher levels of government. It would 
be interesting to say the least if we could randomly change the identity and activities of 
the president of a country, or even the governor of a state, so as to determine how voters 
react to corrupt governors and presidents relative to legislators but of course this is 
impossible. In keeping with this limitation, we must be wary of extrapolating from these 
results to all executive politicians and all legislative politicians.63 However, such scope 
conditions are not unique to experimental work and should not be seen as a weakness of 
the study. 
                                                 
63 For example, voters may view executives in national government differently than local executives, and 





This paper is concerned with how voters react to political corruption. The negative effects 
of political corruption – defined as the misuse of public office for private gain – have 
been well noted.64 Political corruption retards economic prosperity in both macro level 
(Mauro 1996) and micro level studies (Fisman and Svensson 2007). Corruption is bad for 
social trust (Uslaner 2008), political legitimacy (Seligson 2002), public service delivery, 
and tax revenues (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton 2000). Gone are the 
days when corruption was seen as grease in the wheels of the economy, or “functional to 
the maintenance of a political system” (Huntington 1968, p64). However, the puzzle 
remains as to why voters do not punish corrupt politicians out of hand (Kurer 2001, 
Golden 2005). Explaining this puzzle is crucial is if we hope to understand why 
democratization and transparency programs have been unable to curb corruption 
(Weyland 1998).  
There is renewed interest in recent years in explaining the lack of sanctioning of corrupt 
politicians by voters. It is possible that voters do not really care about corruption and that 
respondents’ negative views are simply ‘cheap talk’. Indeed, macro level research 
consistently finds little electoral consequence for acts of corruption by public officials. 
Golden and Chang’s (2001) work on Italy from the first post-World War II parliament to 
the 1990s shows a lack of punishment of corrupt politicians in all but one parliament 
studied. In his study of Japan, Reed (1999) finds that legislators who are indicted of 
corruption only lose a few percentage points in vote share in subsequent elections, and 
can often gain in percentage of vote share. In the US, Peters and Welch (1980) find that 
corrupt members of the House of Representatives were more likely to win reelection than 
                                                 
64 This definition is used by the World Bank (1997) and most researchers. This project focuses on 




to lose, although they did suffer some loss in vote share.  
Limitations to country level research led to more extensive micro level research on 
corruption and voter behavior. Recent experimental work has exposed respondents to 
information on corrupt mayors (Chong et al 2011; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Klašnja and 
Tucker 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013), with results showing that voters are 
averse to corrupt politicians once exposed to credible information about them.65 
However, there is no research that measures the level of attribution of responsibility for 
politicians at varying levels of authority. After all, not all politicians are mayors and it is 
at least possible that voters consider the type of position held by politicians as relevant. 
That is, voters could discount corruption at a higher rate for politicians who have higher 
levels of responsibility or opportunity for corruption. Extensive research, for example, 
has shown that attribution of responsibility varies consistently among politicians charged 
with different levels of political responsibility (Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Alcaniz and 
Hellwig 2011). In light of the existing findings on responsibility attribution, existing 
analyses of corruption may be over or under reporting the voters’ willingness to punish 
corrupt politicians when focusing on mayors. 
There is also reason to believe that context matters: whether corruption is seen as 
common within the political system may matter to how a voter evaluates the performance 
of a politician. Voters may perceive corruption as an unavoidable behavior in corruption-
ridden environments, where clean politicians may be perceived as weak or unable to act 
of the best interest of voters by not learning how to play the game. In this context, voters 
                                                 
65 Although Ferraz and Finan (2008) cannot technically be considered an experiment I refer to is as such for 
the sake of simplicity because the authors use an experimental design that draws on exogenous variation in 




may be more tolerant of corrupt politicians when corruption is seen as pervasive or 
unavoidable. A formal treatment of this problem is eloquently described by Fearon 
(1999), who argues that elections are an opportunity for voters to choose a ‘good type’ 
rather than necessarily evaluate politicians in the way we traditionally believe. What 
counts as a ‘good type’ may change depending on the environment in which this person 
must act. 
In this article I seek to address these important lacunas in existing research—that 
politicians may differ in the extent that they are considered responsible and that 
contextual corruption matters—and experimentally test two sets of hypotheses related to 
corruption and electoral accountability. Firstly, the experiment tests whether the overall 
level of corruption may explain responsibility deflection. That is, whether corrupt 
politicians face lower sanctions when committing acts of corruption in an environment in 
which corruption is common. Secondly, the experiment measures the extent to which 
voters attribute responsibility for acts of corruption when the accused politician holds a 
legislative rather than an executive position.  
The experiments were carried out using a convenience sample at the University of 
Maryland, College Park, and participants were asked to read a fictitious (but ostensibly 
real) newspaper article about a fictitious politician and answer a variety of questions. The 
treatments were embedded in the newspaper article and were randomly assigned among 
participants: some subjects were exposed to information that described the corrupt 




some subjects were told that corruption is common in the city government, some were 
told that the city is a model of good governance.66  
Results provide clear evidence that people are more tolerant of corrupt politicians when 
they are told that corruption is common in the environment in which the corrupt actor 
operates. They also show that people do consider the political position of a politician 
when evaluating acts of corruption.  
Recent micro-level work has attempted to go beyond merely testing whether voters 
dislike corruption, taking into account the source of the information (Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro 2014), the type of corruption in question (Botero et al 2014), partisanship 
(Anduiza et al 2013), and the political environment in which the politician operates 
(Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg 2014; Klašnja, Little and Tucker 2014). 
This paper builds on and engages with this work bringing together several strands of the 
corruption literature and testing these experimentally. These results contribute to our 
understanding of how voters evaluate the misdeeds of politicians.  
While much previous work has not taken into account the importance of context when 
dealing with issues of corruption, and indeed the importance of how information is 
presented to voters, evidence presented here indicates that this may be an important 
consideration when approaching issues of accountability. Voters who are told that 
corruption in a political environment is common are less likely to bother punishing a 
corrupt politician, if the replacement is likely to come from this same environment. 
                                                 
66 There are therefore four separate conditions: Corrupt Mayor, Corruption is Common; Corrupt Mayor, 





Rather than rally voters to stamp out corruption, presenting corruption as common may 
serve to dissuade voters from doing so when it comes to their own political 
representatives. The experimental approach demonstrates that it is not the case that there 
is ‘something different’ about voters in corrupt countries that makes them appear to be 
more tolerant of corruption. Rather, even respondents in a relatively corruption-free 
country can be more tolerant of corruption when they are told that corruption is common. 
This project also highlights the importance of the position of the politician, e.g., whether 
the politician is in an executive or legislative position. The results presented here show 
that this also has an effect on how political misdeeds are evaluated. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The saying goes that sunshine is the best antiseptic. However, this assumes that context 
does not matter and that voters punish political misdeeds indiscriminately: voters should 
react in the same way to information about corruption regardless of the environment of 
the political actor or who the corrupt actor is. Tavits (2007) argues that increased clarity 
of responsibility encourages politicians to choose good policies and avoid corruption 
because they are likely to be punished by voters if they do not do so. According to this 
reasoning, voters will punish politicians they know to be corrupt, ceteris paribus. The 
observable implications of this are that respondents should react similarly negatively 
regardless of whether the politician is presented as operating in a corrupt political 





However, there is reason to believe that context matters. And, there is reason to think that 
voters do not treat executives and legislators the same when evaluating politicians. This is 
an issue that has received scant attention in the literature although some theorists have 
touched on it (Golden 2005, Walzer 1973).  
Fearon (1999) eloquently illustrates that voters likely approach elections as opportunities 
to choose ‘good types’ rather than as opportunities to sanction politicians. Fearon shows 
this to be the case by examining how voters approach the issue of elections. He makes 
three observations to illustrate his claim that voters do not approach elections as 
opportunities to sanction. Firstly, voters dislike ‘office seekers’, seeing as negative the 
trait of ‘just wanting to be reelected’. If voters viewed elections as opportunities to 
sanction, they would be happy to see politicians whose goal is reelection: these 
politicians would be more responsive to the electorate. Secondly, voters are generally 
against term limits. If voters wanted elections for the purpose of sanctioning then term 
limits would rob voters of this ability: choosing a politician who can only serve one term 
means that one is choosing a politician who can never be sanctioned. Thirdly, voters 
seem to respond to consistency in their office holders, even when the consistent position 
is far from their own position on the issue. Fearon gives the example of Ronald Reagan 
whom many supported because they felt they knew where he stood on important issues, 
even when they disagreed with him on these issues.  
Rather than considering elections as an opportunity to sanction politicians, Fearon 
proposes that we view elections as an opportunity to choose a ‘good type’ for political 




In this paper I argue that what a voter considers a ‘good type’ varies according to the 
environment and to the political position of the politician. Assuming that voters choose 
politicians who they consider good types it stands to reason that voters’ understanding of 
what a good type is would change according to the environment in which the politician 
operates. There is also reason to believe that voters may evaluate politicians differently 
depending on the type of office the politician holds (in this case, executive versus 
legislative positions).  
Following Fearon I take competence and honesty to be two important criteria when 
choosing the type one wants in office. In an environment in which corruption is rare one 
can expect a high level of honesty. This is because if the politician’s level of honesty falls 
below a certain threshold – for example, the average level of honesty in the political 
environment – then one can sanction the politician and assume that the replacement will 
likely be at or around the average level of honesty. That is, the replacement will likely be 
at a higher level of honesty than the original. For low corruption environments this 
strategy works well: voters can punish a corrupt politician and he will most likely be 
replaced by an honest one. However, for high corruption environments, the average level 
of honesty in the environment is low. Sanctioning a politician whose level of honesty is 
low in an absolute sense but whose relative level of honesty is merely the same as that of 
the environment from which politicians are chosen may appear pointless. This is because 
one can assume that the next politician will be at the same level of honesty as the 
environment. This is even more likely if we approach the selection of the next politician 
as a random draw. It is possible that the level of honesty will be significantly higher than 




even less honest than the original. Given the low level of honesty in the environment this 
is a real fear: better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.  
Therefore, if a politician is competent and his level of honesty matches the overall level 
of honesty in the environment then the voter is better off sticking with this politician than 
drawing from the environment. The draw from the environment is not likely to be more 
honest. And, the competence of the potential replacement is difficult to determine before 
he takes office. 
The observable implications of this are that voters should not punish a competent 
politician who is corrupt in a corrupt environment.67 At the same time, voters should 
punish a competent politician who is corrupt in a clean environment, assuming that the 
politician’s competence is not highly unusual.68   
This logic of where the replacement politician is chosen from also effects how one 
considers politicians at different levels or different political positions. The replacement 
for a mayor is likely to come from the political establishment – that is, the replacement 
for a mayor is likely to come from the city council or somewhere else in the political 
environment. This is simply in virtue of the fact that the mayoralty is a higher level 
position. Although outsiders and reformers often do manage to become elected to such 
                                                 
67 This paper does not deal with the issue of different types of corruption. Botero et al (2014) argue that 
voters react differently to different types of corruption. For our purposes here, we can assume that the 
corrupt politician whose environment is corrupt does not have a higher or lower level of corruption than is 
the average in his environment. It seems reasonable that an ultra-corrupt politician in a high corruption 
environment would be more likely to be sanctioned than a politician who is corrupt but not egregiously so 
relative to the environment.  
68 Work by Klasnja, Tucker and Little (2014) has shown formally that voters in high corruption 
environments are not harmed by one additional corrupt politician. The opposite is true of voters in low 
corruption environments. For this reason, voters in low corruption environments are incentivized to root out 




positions, in ‘politics as usual’ lower level politicians work their way up to such 
positions.  
However, for a lower level position there is greater chance that the replacement will 
come from outside this environment. Thus there may be different considerations when 
deciding whether one is content with a competent but corrupt mayor versus a competent 
but corrupt city council member. For a corrupt mayor in a corrupt environment the 
replacement will likely be corrupt also (but with an unknown level of competence). For a 
corrupt city council member in a corrupt environment the replacement will be less likely 
to be corrupt as this lower level position is more easily attained by an outsider. Assuming 
that the average person is less corrupt, or more honest, than the average city council 
member on a corrupt city council, there may be little reason to stick with the corrupt city 
council member. That is, the voter may be inclined to take a random draw from the public 
as a replacement.  
Nonetheless, the voter is still taking a gamble when replacing a competent council 
member with an unknown replacement. The replacement may be less corrupt but may 
also be less competent. To what extent might this matter to the voter? In a relative sense, 
it should matter less than for a mayor. After all, executives like mayors have a large 
amount of agency and so must be competent to run an administration, make executive 
decisions, be the public face of the city, etc. This is not the case for council members. 
There is a sense in which the competence of one individual member is tempered by the 
competence of the body as a whole. If a voter could simultaneously replace all members 




presumably she would. However, taking a gamble on a replacement council member is 
not a very high risk move. The potential brilliance of this replacement will be tempered 
by the abilities of the other members, as will the potential incompetence. The potential 
for disaster is limited. One may reasonably take a risk on a council member; one wants 
the candidate for mayor to be tried and tested.    
Therefore, we should observe corrupt mayors in corrupt environments receiving more 
support than corrupt council members in corrupt environments. Replacing a corrupt 
mayor is a bigger gamble than replacing a corrupt council member because of the high 
level of agency that a mayor has, and so the high level of competence required of the 
position. In addition, a replacement mayor is likely to come from the political 
establishment (which in this instance is also corrupt). The lower position of city council 
member is not only one that allows for less agency and so requires less competence, but 
also is more attainable for someone outside the political environment. Assuming that 
those outside the political environment are more honest, this means that the replacement 
council member has a greater likelihood of being more honest than does a replacement 
mayor.  
Of course, if corruption is uncommon we should see no difference in the level of support 
for politicians of different offices.  




First of all, looking at all the data, without taking the position of the politician into 
consideration, if corruption is common respondents should be more likely to support a 
corrupt incumbent.  
H1: respondents are more likely to support a corrupt politician when the environment is 
corrupt than when it is clean, all else equal. 
Looking only at the respondents who were told that the politician was the mayor, 
respondents should be more likely to support a corrupt mayor when corruption is 
common in the city government than when it is uncommon. 
H2: respondents are more likely to support a corrupt mayor when the environment is 
corrupt than when it is clean, all else equal.  
Looking only at the respondents who were told that the politician is a member of the city 
council, respondents should support the corrupt council member at the same rate 
regardless of whether corruption is common or not (because the replacement for the 
corrupt politician will not come from the corrupt political environment).  
H3: respondents are no more likely to support a corrupt council member when the 
environment is corrupt than when it is clean, all else equal. 
Looking only at respondents who were told that corruption is common in College Park, 
respondents should be more likely to support the corrupt mayor than the corrupt council 





H4: respondents are more likely to support a corrupt mayor than a corrupt council 
member when the environment is corrupt, all else equal. 
Finally, looking only at instances where respondents were told that corruption is very 
uncommon in College Park, we should see no difference in support for the corrupt mayor 
and the corrupt council member (the replacement for either one would probably not be 
corrupt, since corruption is so uncommon).  
H5: respondents are no more likely to support a corrupt mayor than a corrupt council 
member when the environment is clean, all else equal.  
 
Data and Methodology 
The data for this project were collected using a unique survey experiment. Participants in 
the survey experiment were presented with a fictitious newspaper article about a fictional 
corrupt politician in College Park, MD. The use of fictitious newspaper articles ostensibly 
taken from real publications is common in the literature (Kam and Utych 2011). The 
politician was presented either as the mayor or as a member of the city council of the city 
of College Park. The treatments were embedded in a fictitious but ostensibly real 
newspaper article. The level of corruption in the city government was varied, with some 
participants being told that corruption in the city government was common, and others 
being told that the city was ‘a model of good governance’:  
“The College Park City government has long had a reputation as being somewhat 




developers and business interests allegedly pay members of the city council to 
avoid dealing with permits and inspections commonly associated with 
construction and local businesses.” 
or 
“Prior to these allegations the College Park City government had a reputation as a 
model of good governance, unlike many college towns where allegations of 
corruption between city government and property developers are often rife.” 
Thus the fictitious mayor is placed in the high corruption environment for half of the 
respondents who are given the mayoral condition, and in the low corruption setting for 
the other half. Similarly, respondents who are presented with an article about a corrupt 
City Council member are given a high corruption environment half the time, and a low 
corruption environment half the time.69   
The fictitious article presents the politician (whether mayor or city council member) as 
having been reasonably effective as a politician in the past. The corruption of which he is 
accused is taking bribes in order to fast track building permits for a local property 
developer. The article presents the evidence against the politician as damning: e-mails 
                                                 
69 In effect, this means that the article on the corrupt mayor contains reference both to a corrupt city 
government generally, and to a corrupt city council specifically. The article on the corrupt city council 
member contains the same, but does not contain reference to a corrupt mayor. It may appear at first glance 
that the mayor is potentially exculpated because of having to deal with a corrupt city council; the city 
council is not exculpated because of having to deal with a corrupt mayor. However, this apparent 
imbalance is in keeping with the intended treatment. The mayor’s realm is the entire city government. That 
is, the nature of being mayor is that the environment one works in is larger than if one is a city council 
member. The individual city council member’s environment is the city council but not the mayor’s office.  
Therefore, in presenting a corrupt legislator who works in a corrupt environment there should be no need to 




showing the quid pro quo between the politician and the developer have been leaked to 
the public.  
The experiment was carried out in the Experimental Psychology Laboratory at the 
University of Maryland over four weeks in April and May of 2014. The university 
campus is located in College Park, MD. While the treatment articles were about fictional 
politicians, the politicians were presented as actual city politicians. This was an attempt 
to increase the external validity of the survey experiment, as many students and campus 
employees feel somewhat invested in the city of College Park, even if they do not follow 
city politics. Largely for this reason, the survey experiment was not carried out online – 
respondents’ first reaction would likely have been to look up the politician they were 
reading about online. This made the experiment more expensive and time consuming but 
overcomes some of the criticisms of experiments that use hypothetical politicians and 
situations.70 As deception was used all participants were debriefed at the end of the 
study.71 
The sample consists of 281 people, mainly students, who chose to participate in the 
survey experiment. Respondents were recruited to participate in a current events study 
that would take no more than ten minutes. While most were undergraduates (53% 
answered ‘some college credit’ when asked about their education), 26% had a bachelor’s 
                                                 
70 In fact, several respondents sought me out after they finished the survey and read the debriefing to tell me 
that they had been ‘fooled’ by the fake newspaper article. A total of 8 respondents were able to correctly 
identify the current mayor of College Park, Andrew Fellows. This amounts to less than 3% of the survey 
sample. 
71 You have taken part in a study to better understand how people react to information about corrupt 
politicians. The articles you read were fictional, and the politician about whom you read does not actually 
exist. The petition and meeting referred to are also fictional. While some corruption exists in state and 
national politics, the United States ranks very well on international measures of corruption. The researchers 




degree or higher. While 48% of the sample was between 17 and 21, 52% was 21 and over 
and the oldest respondent was 61. Household income was skewed toward higher income 
brackets, with 44% responding that their household income was $100,000 or more 
(students who were financially dependent on their parents were asked to report their 
parents’ income). The sample was 57% female. Although there was variation in the party 
affiliation of the participants, Democrats were over represented at 68%, with 17% 
Republicans, 9% Independents, and 5% third party.72  
Respondents are similar across conditions. Descriptive statistics show that the conditions 
were effectively randomized (see Appendix). The only instance in which there is a 
statistically significant difference between two groups tested is when looking at the age 
and income for the two conditions tested for H5. However, I do not consider this to be a 
problem for two reasons. The first is that aside from examining the difference in means 
between conditions, I also treat the data as observational and control for standard 
demographic variables (see Appendix). The second is that there is no clear theoretical 
reason why such substantively small differences between the groups would matter. 
Prior to treatment, respondents were asked a series of demographic questions as well as 
questions on political attitudes. After reading about a fictitious politician, respondents 
were asked how likely they would be to vote for the politician. Following other 
                                                 
72 Respondents were asked about party affiliation after they had read the news article. This was because the 
article does not mention the party of the politician. Asking about party affiliation may have primed the 
respondent to take note of the fictional politician’s party affiliation. This worked surprisingly well as 





experimental work on corruption, the variable on how likely the respondent would be to 
vote for the politician serves as the main dependent variable in the study.73   
Nonetheless, the sample poses two potential problems. The first is the external validity 
that comes with all convenience samples. As Kam et al write, many researchers defer to 
“the simplistic heuristic of ‘a student sample lacks external generalizability’” (Kam et al. 
2007, 421). This is despite the fact that there is a long tradition of convenience samples in 
the social sciences, most obviously psychology and behavioral economics, and that Kam 
et al show that up to 70% of experiments in some more specialized political science 
journals between 1990 and 2006 relied on student samples. Of course, the sample for this 
experiment is not entirely made up of students, but is still somewhat open to these 
criticisms. However, going on Druckman and Kam (2011), the fact that there is some 
variation in the sample means that the criticisms against the sample as one of 
convenience is largely negated. That is, the sample is not made up entirely of one group, 
eg, freshman psychology majors. As Druckman and Kam also point out, achieving a 
representative sample does not mean that one has sidestepped variation across situations 
and time. In addition, the strengths of the experimental method are the standardization of 
the treatment and the randomization of the participants, which of course remain when 
using a convenience sample (McDermott 2002).  
The second potential problem is using a sample from a country with relatively low levels 
of political corruption to study how people react to corruption. This is compounded by 
the fact that recent work by Klašnja and Tucker (2013) has shown that study participants 
                                                 





in a high corruption country (Moldova) were less likely to punish a hypothetical corrupt 
politician than those in a low corruption country (Sweden). However, the fact that one 
would expect participants in a study carried out in a country with a relatively low level of 
corruption to react more negatively to information about corruption further bolsters any 
results that show participants being willing to support a corrupt politician.  
To summarize, this paper uses a unique survey experiment to expose respondents to 
information about fictitious corrupt politicians. In order to determine whether people 
react differently to information about politicians in executive positions than to 
information about politicians in legislative positions, respondents are randomly assigned 
a condition where the corrupt incumbent is a mayor or a condition where the corrupt 
incumbent is a city council member. In order to determine whether people take the level 
of corruption in the environment in which the politician operates into account, 
respondents are randomly assigned to a condition where corruption is common, or to a 
condition in which corruption is uncommon.  
Results 
The first question is whether respondents treat the corrupt politician the same regardless 
of whether corruption is common.  That is, regardless of the position of the politician, are 
respondents more likely to support a corrupt politician when corruption is common? 
Looking at the difference in means between the two treatment groups, 20% of 
respondents would vote for the corrupt politician when corruption is common, while only 
14% would vote for the corrupt politician when corruption is uncommon.74 This is a 
                                                 




difference of 6 percentage points in the expected direction, and is statistically significant 
(p= .07, one-tailed test). Respondents were 42% more likely to support a corrupt 
politician when they were told that corruption is common in the city government. 
Therefore, we find evidence in support of H1: respondents are more likely to support a 
corrupt politician when the environment is corrupt. 
The second hypothesis tests whether respondents are more likely to support a corrupt 
mayor when corruption is common than when corruption is uncommon. Looking at the 
difference in means between the two treatment groups, 29% of respondents would vote 
for the corrupt mayor when corruption is common, compared to 16% who would vote for 
the corrupt mayor when corruption is uncommon. This is a 13 percentage point increase 
in support: almost twice as many respondents would vote for the corrupt mayor when 
corruption is common as would vote for him when corruption is uncommon. This 
difference is statistically significant at standard levels (p= .03, one-tailed test). 
Therefore, we find strong evidence in support of H2: respondents are indeed more likely 
to support a corrupt mayor when corruption is common in the environment than when 
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Graph showing paired comparisons for all hypotheses. ‘Politician’ is a combination of 
the mayor and council member categories. Point estimates without a hollow circle are for 
treatment groups where corruption is uncommon. 
 
The third hypothesis tests whether respondents are more likely to support a corrupt city 
council member when the environment is corrupt than when it is clean. Looking at the 
difference in means between the two treatment groups, 11% of respondents would vote 
for the corrupt city council member when corruption is common, compared to 12% that 
would vote for him when corruption is uncommon. That is, there is no statistical 
difference between the two treatment groups (p=.95, two-tailed test). Respondents would 
support a corrupt city council member at the same rate when corruption is common as 




Therefore, we find strong evidence in support of H3: respondents are not more likely to 
support a corrupt city council member when corruption is common in the environment 
than when corruption is uncommon in the environment.  
The fourth hypothesis tests whether there is any difference in when respondents would 
support a mayor or a council member, when corruption is common. Looking at the 
difference in means between the two groups, 29% of respondents would vote for the 
corrupt mayor when corruption is common, compared to only 11% that would vote for 
the corrupt city council member. This is a difference of 18 percentage points. More than 
twice as many people would vote for a corrupt mayor than for a corrupt legislator, when 
corruption is common – even though the politicians have been accused of the same crime 
and are identical except for the office they hold. This result is statistically significant at 
99% confidence (p= .00, one-tailed test). 
Therefore, we find strong evidence in favor of H4: respondents are more likely to support 
a corrupt mayor than a corrupt city council member when the environment is corrupt.  
Finally, the fifth hypothesis tests whether respondents are more likely to vote for a 
corrupt mayor than a corrupt city council member when corruption is uncommon in the 
environment. Looking at the difference in means between the treatment groups, 15% of 
respondents would vote for the corrupt mayor when corruption is uncommon, while 12% 
would vote for the corrupt city council member when corruption is uncommon. However, 




So, when told that College Park city government is corruption free, respondents are no 
more likely to support a corrupt mayor than a corrupt council member. Therefore, we find 
evidence in support of H5: respondents are not any more likely to support a corrupt 
mayor than a corrupt city council member when corruption is uncommon.  
Overall, looking at differences in means alone, it is clear that the treatments had an effect, 
and that the effects were in the expected direction. These results show that respondents 
were more tolerant of a corrupt mayor than a corrupt council member when corruption 
was common in the political environment. And, respondents were more tolerant of a 
corrupt mayor when corruption was common in the political environment than when 
corruption was uncommon.  
At the same time, the level of corruption did not matter for when respondents would 
support a city council member. And, when corruption was uncommon, the position of the 
corrupt politician did not matter. Voters are equally likely to punish a corrupt mayor as a 
corrupt city council member, when corruption is uncommon.  
From these results, it is clear that respondents did distinguish between the different 
offices that politicians held: a different calculus was used to determine whether to support 
a mayor than a council member. It is also clear that respondents distinguished between 
political environments in which corruption is common and in which corruption is 
uncommon.75   
                                                 
75 Probit models that include demographic variables produce the same results. These results are reported 




Discussion and Conclusion 
The claim that sunshine is the best antiseptic implies that once a voter knows about 
corruption she will punish the corrupt actor regardless of the actor’s position or the 
political context. Overall, it is clear that this was not the case here. Respondents did not 
treat all actors in the same way. Results show that voters take the level of corruption into 
account for a corrupt mayor, but not for corrupt legislator. I have argued that this is to be 
expected as a replacement mayor would likely be drawn from the corrupt political 
environment, while a replacement council member would likely be drawn from outside 
this environment. Therefore, respondents do not take the level of corruption in the 
political environment into account when evaluating legislators, but do take it into account 
when evaluating higher level executives.  
The fact that respondents did take the political environment into account is a result that 
adds to recent formal and experimental research on corruption and is further evidence 
that voters in high corruption environments act differently, and evaluate politicians 
differently, than voters in low corruption environments. It is also evidence that voters 
may quickly and easily change their behavior when they perceive an environment to be 
one in which there is a high level of corruption.  
Overall, this paper is the first research to deal with how voters use different standards to 
evaluate corrupt politicians in different positions (executive or legislative). This is 
important for policy as well as academic reasons. Policy makers who seek to reduce 
corruption may want to consider where they spend their energies in increasing 




more insulated from the wrath of the public when they run for reelection. Academic 
researchers may want to consider the position of politicians used in experiments, and 
consider how generalizable results that focus on a particular political position can be. In 
fact, the results presented here indicate that experimental work that focuses on mayors 
may be underestimating the effect of information about political corruption on support for 
the incumbent, relative to other political positions.  
The results on the environment of corrupt politicians are also important for policy reasons 
and academic reasons. Policy makers should appreciate that voters in high corruption 
environments will act differently than voters in low corruption environments. Work on 
corruption traps must be incorporated into strategies that aim to reduce political 
corruption: merely exposing voters to information is not enough. These results also raise 
interesting questions about how the media cover corruption. We saw here that just a few 
lines in a newspaper article, claiming that corruption is common, was enough of a 
treatment to change the behavior of respondents. Media coverage that presents political 
environments as completely corrupt may actually be doing more harm than good, if it 
means that voters are less likely to punish any given corrupt politician. For academic 
research, these results bolster claims made in formal theory research showing that the 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
H1: Corruption Common Vs Corruption Uncommon 
  
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff P 
Age (Common) 140 22.6 6.62 
  Age (Uncommon) 140 23.29 7.48 
  
    
-0.692 0.412 
Gender (Common) 140 1.58 0.494 
  Gender (Uncommon) 140 1.56 0.497 
  
    
0.021 0.718 
Education (Common) 141 4.92 1.637 
  Education (Uncommon)  140 5.06 1.71 
  
    
-0.135 0.5 
Income (Common) 141 4.6 1.86 
  Income (Uncommon) 139 4.96 1.61 
  
    
-0.325 0.11 
Democrat (Common) 141 0.588 0.493 
  Democrat (Uncommon) 140 0.685 0.465 
  










H2: Mayor (Corruption is Common) Vs Mayor (Corruption is 
Uncommon) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff P 
Age (Common) 69 22.76 7.23 
  Age (Uncommon) 71 24.83 8.97 
  
    
-2.06 0.13 
Gender (Common) 70 1.57 0.498 
  Gender (Uncommon) 71 1.6 0.492 
  
    
-0.034 0.68 
Education (Common) 70 4.91 1.725 
  Education (Uncommon)  71 5.35 1.749 
  
    
-0.437 0.13 
Income (Common) 70 4.64 1.77 
  Income (Uncommon) 71 4.9 1.6 
  
    
-0.258 0.366 
Democrat (Common) 70 0.585 0.496 
  Democrat (Uncommon) 71 0.676 0.471 
  
    
-0.09 0.26 






H3: Member (Corruption is Common) Vs Member (Corruption is 
Uncommon) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff P 
Age (Common) 71 22.43 6 
  Age (Uncommon) 69 21.71 5.16 
  
    
0.726 0.444 
Gender (Common) 70 1.6 0.493 
  Gender (Uncommon) 69 1.52 0.505 
  
    
0.078 0.35 
Education (Common) 71 4.94 1.55 
  Education (Uncommon)  69 4.76 1.64 
  
    
0.175 0.51 
Income (Common) 71 4.63 1.95 
  Income (Uncommon) 68 5.02 1.63 
  
    
-0.395 0.19 
Democrat (Common) 71 0.591 0.495 
  Democrat (Uncommon) 69 0.695 0.463 
  
    
-0.104 0.2 






H4: Mayor (Corruption is Common) Vs Member (Corruption is 
Common) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff P 
Age (Mayor) 69 22.76 7.23 
  Age (Member) 71 22.43 6 
  
    
0.331 0.76 
Gender (Mayor) 70 1.57 0.498 
  Gender (Member) 70 1.6 0.493 
  
    
-0.028 0.73 
Education (Mayor) 70 4.91 1.71 
  Education (Member) 71 4.94 1.55 
  
    
-0.029 0.91 
Income (Mayor) 70 4.64 1.77 
  Income (Member) 71 4.63 1.95 
  
    
0.009 0.97 
Democrat (Mayor) 70 0.585 0.496 
  Democrat (Member) 71 0.591 0.495 
  
    
-0.005 0.94 






H5: Mayor (Corruption is Uncommon) Vs Member (Corruption is 
Uncommon) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff P 
Age (Mayor) 71 24.83 8.97 
  Age (Member) 69 21.71 5.16 
  
    
3.12 0.01 
Gender (Mayor) 71 1.6 0.492 
  Gender (Member) 69 1.52 0.503 
  
    
0.083 0.32 
Education (Mayor) 71 5.35 1.74 
  Education (Member) 69 4.76 1.64 
  
    
0.583 0.04 
Income (Mayor) 71 4.9 1.6 
  Income (Member) 68 5.02 1.63 
  
    
-0.128 0.64 
Democrat (Mayor) 71 0.676 0.471 
  Democrat (Member) 69 0.695 0.463 
  




All differences between treatments and control and between treatments are statistically 




Gender coding: 1 = male; 2 = female. 
Education coding: 1= 1st to 8th grade; 2 = Some high school, but no diploma; 3 = High 
school diploma or equivalent; 4 = Some college credit, but no degree; 5 = 
Trade/technical/vocational training; 6 = Associate’s degree; 7 = Bachelor’s degree; 8 = 
Master’s degree; 9 = Doctoral degree 
Income (household) coding: 1 = less than $10,000; 2 = $10,000 - $24,999; 3 = $25,000 - 
$49,999 ; 4 = %50,000 - $74,999; 5 = $75,000 - $99,999; 6 = $100,000 - $149,999; 7 = 
$150,000 or more 



















Appendix 2: Probit Models 
 
 
Table 1. The effect of environmental corruption on the likelihood of supporting the 
incumbent. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corruption is common treatment 0.209 0.429** -0.122 
 (0.190) (0.264) (0.302) 
Age  0.00743 -0.00519 0.0288 
 (0.0163) (0.0219) (0.0288) 
Female  -0.580*** -0.718*** -0.437 
 (0.191) (0.265) (0.302) 
Education  0.0108 0.0648 -0.0459 
 (0.0698) (0.0934) (0.119) 
Income  -0.0762 -0.0585 -0.130 
 (0.0636) (0.0941) (0.0981) 
Democrat -0.322 -0.336 -0.415 
 (0.215) (0.284) (0.371) 
Independent 0.318 0.602 0.0785 
 (0.326) (0.498) (0.492) 
Student  0.0814 0.221 0.0549 
 (0.245) (0.329) (0.411) 
Constant -0.545 -0.561 -0.550 
 (0.717) (1.001) (1.122) 
    
Observations 278 140 138 
LogLik -115.8 -64.37 -45.65 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tests for the corruption is common variable are one-tailed. 
The corruption is common variable is coded as 1 if the respondent is told that corruption 
is common in city government.  
Model 1 is for all cases. 
Model 2 is for cases where the politician is a mayor. 











Table 2. The effect of political position on the likelihood of supporting the incumbent. 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Mayor  0.496*** 0.759*** 0.219 
 (0.194) (0.279) (0.288) 
Age  0.00390 0.0109 0.00306 
 (0.0162) (0.0256) (0.0227) 
Female  -0.611*** -0.799*** -0.381 
 (0.194) (0.270) (0.290) 
Education  -0.00266 0.00271 0.0142 
 (0.0696) (0.112) (0.0946) 
Income  -0.101 -0.109 -0.0676 
 (0.0644) (0.0884) (0.108) 
Democrat -0.323 -0.494 -0.156 
 (0.217) (0.302) (0.330) 
Independent 0.394 0.172 0.590 
 (0.333) (0.448) (0.539) 
Student  0.118 0.259 0.0707 
 (0.247) (0.352) (0.368) 
Constant -0.464 -0.573 -0.835 
 (0.692) (0.954) (1.115) 
    
Observations 278 139 139 
LogLik -113 -57.94 -52.77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tests for the mayor variable are one-tailed. 
The mayor variable is a dummy coded as 1 when the politician is the mayor and 0 when 
the politician is a city council member. 
Model 4 is for all cases. 
Model 5 is for cases where corruption is common. 









Appendix 3: Newspaper Articles 
Council Member; Corruption is Common 
 
 
College Park Council Member Exposed for 
Corruption 
By Philip Blake and John Rucker, The Baltimore Sun 
1:15 p.m. EST, January 8, 2014 
 
A series of newly disclosed e-mails and text messages suggests that College Park City Council 
member Richard Wildstein received benefits from property developers in return for fast 
tracking zoning permits in the city of College Park. The allegations come months before 
Wildstein is to stand for reelection and cast doubt over his political future.  
E-mails leaked to the public show Wildstein soliciting favors in return for building permits. 
Some of these favors included a position for his son at one of the construction companies 
and a discount on a condominium built by another of the companies.  
The College Park City Council has long had a reputation as being somewhat corrupt. The 
most common allegations are of ‘pay to play’ politics where developers and business 
interests allegedly pay members of the city council to avoid dealing with permits and 
inspections commonly associated with construction and local businesses. 
Prior to this incident Wildstein was generally regarded as an effective member of the 
council. As well as successfully applying for state and federal funds for the development 
of the city, he was seen as a reliable representative of his constituents and someone to 




Local resident Samantha Meyers commented, “This has been going on for years. I’m not 
surprised. Overall he does a good job. I’ll continue to support him.” 
Another local resident, Patrick Smyth, commented, “You hear stories of this kind of thing, 
but I didn’t think it actually happened. I definitely won’t be voting for Wildstein in the next 
election.” 






















Mayor; Corruption is Common 
 
 
College Park Mayor Exposed for Corruption 
By Philip Blake and John Rucker, The Baltimore Sun 
1:15 p.m. EST, January 8, 2014 
 
A series of newly disclosed e-mails and text messages suggests that College Park City Mayor 
Richard Wildstein received benefits from property developers in return for fast tracking 
zoning permits in the city of College Park. The allegations come months before Wildstein is 
to stand for reelection and cast doubt over his political future.  
E-mails leaked to the public show Wildstein soliciting favors in return for building permits. 
Some of these favors included a position for his son at one of the construction companies 
and a discount on a condominium built by another of the companies.  
The College Park City government has long had a reputation as being somewhat corrupt. 
The most common allegations are of ‘pay to play’ politics where developers and business 
interests allegedly pay members of the city council to avoid dealing with permits and 
inspections commonly associated with construction and local businesses. 
Prior to this incident Wildstein was generally regarded as an effective mayor. As well as 
successfully applying for state and federal funds for the development of the city, he was 
seen as a reliable representative of his constituents and someone to whom residents could 
turn with problems. 
Local resident Samantha Meyers commented, “This has been going on for years. I’m not 




Another local resident, Patrick Smyth, commented, “You hear stories of this kind of thing, 
but I didn’t think it actually happened. I definitely won’t be voting for Wildstein in the next 
election.” 





Council Member; Corruption is Uncommon 
 
 
College Park Council Member Exposed for 
Corruption 
By Philip Blake and John Rucker, The Baltimore Sun 
1:15 p.m. EST, January 8, 2014 
 
A series of newly disclosed e-mails and text messages suggests that College Park City Council 
member Richard Wildstein received benefits from property developers in return for fast 
tracking zoning permits in the city College Park. The allegations come months before 
Wildstein is to stand for reelection and cast doubt over his political future.  
E-mails leaked to the public show Wildstein soliciting favors in return for building permits. 
Some of these favors included a position for his son at one of the construction companies 
and a discount on a condominium built by another of the companies.  
Prior to these allegations the College Park City Council had a reputation as a model of good 
governance, unlike many college towns where allegations of corruption between city 
government and property developers are often rife.  
Prior to this incident Wildstein was generally regarded as an effective member of the 
council. As well as successfully applying for state and federal funds for the development of 
the city, he was seen as a reliable representative of his constituents and someone to whom 
residents could turn with problems. 
Local resident Samantha Meyers commented, “You hear stories of this kind of thing 










Mayor; Corruption is Uncommon 
 
 
College Park Mayor Exposed for Corruption 
By Philip Blake and John Rucker, The Baltimore Sun 
1:15 p.m. EST, January 8, 2014 
 
A series of newly disclosed e-mails and text messages suggests that College Park Mayor 
Richard Wildstein received benefits from property developers in return for fast tracking 
zoning permits in the city of College Park. The allegations come months before Wildstein is 
to stand for reelection and cast doubt over his political future.  
E-mails leaked to the public show Wildstein soliciting favors in return for building permits. 
Some of these favors included a position for his son at one of the construction companies 
and a discount on a condominium built by another of the companies.  
Prior to these allegations College Park City government had a reputation as a model of good 
governance, unlike many college towns where allegations of corruption between city 
government and property developers are often rife.  
Prior to this incident Wildstein was generally regarded as an effective mayor. As well as 
successfully applying for state and federal funds for the development of the city, he was 
seen as a reliable representative of his constituents and someone to whom residents could 
turn to with problems. 
Local resident Samantha Meyers commented, “You hear stories of this kind of thing 














Overall, this project has shown that there is more to ensuring the electoral defeat of 
corrupt politicians than transparency. Evidence presented here has shown that issue 
salience will cause voters to discount charges of corruption against corrupt politicians. 
When politicians are close to voters on issues they care about, voters are likely to support 
them even if they are corrupt. The more a voter cares about the issue, the less she cares 
about corruption. However, high institutional trust will decrease the effect of issue 
salience, while perceptions of corruption will increase it. I have shown that social norms, 
created in one’s peer group, affect the likelihood that one will support a corrupt 
politician, as do perceptions of political corruption. Finally, I have presented evidence 
that politicians who operate in corrupt political environments are less likely to be 
punished by voters, especially if they are in higher level positions (where the replacement 
would likely be taken from this corrupt political environment).  
It is not clear from these findings how anti-corruption practitioners should proceed. 
Certainly, it seems that presenting any political environment as completely corrupt will 
not be helpful in rallying voters to stomp out corruption. While anti-corruption parties 
emerge from time to time it is unclear whether these collective attempts to reduce 
corruption are successful. Rather, it seems that voters discount allegations of corruption 
when corruption is presented as the norm. 
The findings on issue salience point to one way in which politicians can protect 
themselves when allegations of corruption are made against them. Issue trespassing, 




allow politicians to evade electoral punishment. Certainly, moving toward hot button 
issues or populist rhetoric on important issues is something an embattled politician might 
easily default to. But, the fact that institutional trust can undo the importance of issue 
salience when a voter chooses whether to support a corrupt politician is hopeful. 
Although trust in the institution that the corrupt politician is a member of may be difficult 
to nourish, it is possible that trust in other institutions can encourage a general 
institutional trust that is sufficient to increase the likelihood of electoral defeat for corrupt 
political actors. Certainly, the extent to which institutional trust can be increased by trust 
in non-electoral institutions is something that is an important avenue for future research.  
Of course, perceiving political corruption to be common has the opposite effect of 
institutional trust. As mentioned in the introduction, the two are related and there may 
exist some mutual causality (Morris and Klesner 2010). However, this result has 
important implications for how corruption is presented by the media and NGOs. 
Presenting political corruption as an everyday occurrence that all politicians engage in, 
may prime voters to expect such behavior and so discount the importance of allegations 
of corruption when they arise. Certainly, it likely goes against every fiber of every 
journalist’s being not to report on corruption. And, silence on corruption is not something 
I would advocate. However, it may be prudent to consider the effects of constantly 
presenting political corruption as the norm when this approach means that voters become 
desensitized to reports of political corruption.     
Voters also seem to discount corruption when they perceive it amongst their peer group. 
It is curious to think that reducing everyday engagement in corruption such as bribery or 




presented here indicates that this could be the case. Theories in sociology such as the 
‘broken window’ theory have previously advocated a zero tolerance approach to minor 
infractions in order to solve larger issues (Kelling 1997). This theory is not without its 
critics (Harcourt and Ludwig 2006), and the practical application of the broken window 
theory has resulted in (or at least been accompanied by) a serious increase in 
incarceration in the United States (Harcourt 2009). Certainly, this is not something to be 
advocated in order to reduce high level corruption! Nonetheless, an anti-corruption 
strategy that took into account the creation of social norms in one’s peer groups may be 
more successful than one that focuses on transparency alone.  
The third paper shows evidence that voters take into account the political position of the 
corrupt politician. Specifically, a higher level corrupt politician may be shielded from 
electoral punishment if it seems that his replacement will likely be from a corrupt 
political environment. Anti-corruption advocates may then have better luck targeting 
lower level politicians whose replacements may realistically be from outside the corrupt 
political environment. This low level approach may also increase institutional trust as 
anti-corruption strategies that start at the lowest rungs of the political ladder may increase 
trust in local government, contributing to a general institutional trust that could reduce 
tolerance of corruption by higher level politicians. Again, this is an avenue for future 
research.  
Any research project is limited in its scope and methods and this is no exception. Future 
research should focus on the scope conditions of issue salience as a predictor of support 
for corrupt politicians. It is not clear that salience on all issues will work the same way as 




elicit a stronger response than do issues related to tax policy or infrastructure spending. 
Then again, given the polarized and charged nature of contemporary US politics, it is 
possible that any issue could elicit the same passion as abortion in the United States. 
Nonetheless, a survey instrument that expands the issues used in the first paper, and 
lengthens the Guttman scales used would give more nuanced data than currently 
available. Of course, replication of the survey in several more countries could also 
produce interesting data.  
The scope conditions of the paper investigating the effect of political position on voter 
tolerance of corruption should also be investigated. It is unclear whether the results 
presented here apply to local government only, or whether a governor would be shielded 
the way a mayor would be. Equally, it is possible that a legislator in a state legislature 
would benefit from some of the tolerance that the fictitious mayor received. It certainly 
seems likely that a governor would be less likely to be punished for corruption if the 
members of the state legislature were also perceived to be corrupt. However, this might 
change if a realistic anti-corruption candidate emerged, showing that the replacement for 
the corrupt governor need not come from the political establishment.  
The goal of this dissertation was to go some way toward answering the question of why 
voters support corrupt politicians. As is so often the case in social science, I am unable to 
give one definitive answer. However, I can say that there is more to the fight against 
political corruption than transparency. The first paper showed clearly that voters are 
willing to support a corrupt politician under conditions that come even somewhat close to 
the tradeoffs involved in real life voting. The third paper showed that even people living 




when told that corruption is common in the political environment, and opt to support a 
corrupt incumbent. This is without dealing with issues of party loyalty, clientelism, or 
any of the institutional factors that decrease the likelihood of voters punishing corrupt 
politicians.  
Overall, this project has shown the limitations of transparency, but solutions to the 
problems of political corruption are less obvious. Nonetheless, focusing on social norms 
that are created from the ground up, institutional trust, and being aware of how political 
corruption is presented, as well as targeting lower level corrupt politicians rather than 
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